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Uganda’s location in a region plagued by armed conflict entails ongoing security 
challenges. The situation becomes even more complicated when the various armed 
groups/insurgencies enjoy the breakdown of security, limited governance, and lack of 
control of vast territories where they operate. This thesis examines the role of ungoverned 
spaces and how they facilitate the survival of terrorist groups in Africa. It further seeks to 
evaluate policy prescriptions available to ameliorate the problem of ungoverned spaces. 
To answer these questions, this thesis uses the Lord’s Resistance Army as a case 
study and analyzes other violent extremist groups—Al-Shabaab, Al Qaeda in the 
Maghreb, and Boko Haram—in relation to ungoverned spaces. The study reveals that 
instability emanating from ungoverned spaces is contagious and can recur even when it 
appears to have been contained. Although interventions through bilateral, regional, and 
multilateral mechanisms may offer some orderliness in ungoverned spaces, the real 
solution may lie in addressing the latent causes of violence and instability. These 
measures include embracing democratic practices and economic empowerment, and 
strengthening government institutions so that states are functional—and spaces are 
governed. 
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Mao Tse Tung famously noted that an insurgency is like a fish in water and once 
the water is denied, it cannot survive.1 The water in Mao’s metaphor was the active or 
passive support of the population.  Popular support may have been essential for 
insurgents who were fighting for national independence in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries—it certainly mattered in Maoist uprisings in China and elsewhere. Today, 
however, the terrorist groups operating in Africa—mainly, the Lord’s Resistance Army 
(LRA), Al-Shabaab, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and Boko Haram—tend 
to operate regardless of the support of the broader population. Instead, they have survived 
because of the presence of ungoverned spaces in their areas of operation that allow them 
to spread their extremist ideology.2  
In their book, Ungoverned Spaces, Trinkunas and Clunan contend that one cannot 
talk about ungoverned spaces without talking about failed states. They define ungoverned 
spaces as social, political and economic zones where states do not have effective control, 
which non-state actors can exploit to avoid state surveillance and undermine state 
sovereignty.3 Clunan and Trinkunas, however, argue that when analyzing ungoverned 
spaces, scholars should not limit themselves to failed states alone but also consider the 
lack of effective sovereignty in organized and strong states like in border areas and inner 
cities of the United States and suburbs in France that tend to harbor criminals.4 
Uganda has such troublesome border areas, a vector for instability compounded 
by a history of insurgencies since the 1980s. One of the longest-running of these 
insurgencies has been waged by the Lord’s Resistance Army from 1986 to this day. This 
                                                 
1 Jarrod J.H. Gillam and James E. Moran, “The United States and Yemen: Coin in the Absence of a 
Legitimate Government” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011). 
2 LRA, Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, AQIM and Other Sources of Instability in Africa: Hearing Before 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives. 112th Cong. 142 (2012) (statement of Ileana 
Ros-Lehtinen, Chairman of House Committee on Foreign Affairs): http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
112hhrg73998/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg73998.pdf. 
3 Ann L. Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas, Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority in an 
Era of Softened Sovereignty (Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), 3. 
4 Clunan and Trinkunas, Ungoverned Spaces, 18. 
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terrorist group currently operates in Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), and the Central African Republic (CAR). The geographical location of 
Uganda in a neighborhood plagued by enduring armed conflict compounds the problem 
of eradicating such an armed group due to the breakdown of security and lack of control 
of vast territories in those countries. By Clunan and Trinkunas’ definition, the 
ungoverned spaces in and around Uganda present a particular security challenge. 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
This thesis addresses two research questions. First, to what extent has the 
persistence of ungoverned spaces contributed to the survival of terrorist groups in Africa? 
Second, how is Uganda addressing the problem of ungoverned spaces within its 
neighborhood?   
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The United States realized early in the 1990s that security threats could emanate 
from weak, failing, and ungoverned spaces. In his book Global Strategic Assessment 
2009: America’s Security Role in a Changing World, Patrick Cronin cautions that 
ungoverned spaces should not only be taken to mean isolated regions of inhospitable 
terrain where governments cannot reach. He notes that if this were the case, we would be 
concerned only with the tribal territories along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, or the 
Khmer Rouge areas in Cambodia, or the eastern part of the DRC. Cronin counsels that 
ungoverned spaces “exist not only in fragile, failing and failed states but also in” migrant 
and immigrant populated slums and inaccessible border regions of well governed states.5  
Regions however, that are contested and endemic with conflict offer terrorists and 
insurgents bases from which to organize, recruit, train, and launch attacks—at home, in 
the region, and against U.S. interests abroad—as well as exporting terror cells. According 
to Clunan and Trinkunas, this terrorism not only threatens global security but also, in the 
long run, undermines principles of “good governance in the international system, respect 
                                                 
5 Patrick M. Cronin, Global Strategic Assessment 2009: America’s Security Role in a Changing World 
(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2009), 101. 
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for human rights and the rule of law.”6 Such conflicts lead to flows of refugees and 
thriving criminal networks associated with the various warring parties in the conflicts.7 
Studies carried out in the Horn of Africa between 1992 and 2006 suggested that 
the region’s weak states—as opposed to its failed ones—provided the most potential for 
terrorist threats. For example, these studies indicated that Al Qaeda found failed states 
like Somalia unfavorable and hostile as bases of operation. Some scholars went so far as 
to claim that some governments in the region, notably Kenya, used their stance against 
terrorism to attract donors and military assistance from the West, whether or not the 
threat was especially pressing or probable.8 
Subsequent events, however, have indicated that the vacuum of power and order 
in Somalia allowed Al-Shabaab, a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization, to 
merge with Al Qaeda, a union which made the Shabaab more sophisticated and 
dangerous in the employment of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and guerilla 
tactics. Al-Shabaab was also reported to have carried out fund-raising activities in the 
United States at the same time, maintaining links with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP).9 On July 12, 2010, Al-Shabaab sprang from its bases in Somalia and struck in 
the region when the group bombed Kampala, killing more than 74 people who were 
watching the World Cup finals.10 The group staged another macabre attack when it killed 
more than 60 people at the Nairobi Westgate Mall on September 21, 2013.11 The group 
continues to carry out terrorist attacks in Somalia and East Africa. 
                                                 
6Clunan and Trinkunas, Ungoverned Spaces, 26. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ken Menkhaus and Jacob N. Shapiro, “Non-State Actors and Failed States: Lessons from Al-Qaeda’s 
Experiences in the Horn of Africa,” in Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of 
Softened Sovereignty, ed. Ann L. Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas (California: Stanford University Press, 
2010), 79. 
9 LRA, Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, AQIM and Other Sources of Instability in Africa. 
10 “Somali Link as 74 World Cup Fans Die in Uganda Blasts,” BBC, July 12, 2010, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/10593771. 
11 “Somalia’s Al-Shabaab Claims Nairobi Westgate Kenya Attack,” BBC, September 22, 2013, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24191606. 
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Similarly, the Lord’s Resistance Army still carries out atrocities against civilians 
in the Central African Republic, Sudan, South Sudan, and the DRC as well. It has been an 
issue of interest on how an insurgency that started in 1986 in northern Uganda in what 
appeared as an attempt to regain state power could eventually spread to four countries if 
the LRA wanted political power only in Uganda. The LRA is an offshoot of the various 
rebellions that broke out in 1986 after Yoweri Museveni captured power after a five-year 
war. When the National Resistance Army (NRA) of Museveni defeated the Uganda 
National Liberation Army (UNLA) of Tito Okello, the UNLA retreated to Sudan. The 
UNLA forces, however, mobilized with support from Sudan’s government and attacked 
the northern Uganda border areas in 1986.12  
The UNLA later transformed into the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) led by Alice 
Lakwena. Lakwena was defeated in 1987 and fled to Kenya. It is at this period that 
Joseph Kony mobilized the remnants of the Lakwena forces into the LRA. Kony declared 
that his aim was to overthrow the government of Museveni and rule Uganda based on the 
biblical Ten Commandments.13 Between 1987 and 2006, the LRA kept moving to and 
from Sudan to carry out attacks in Uganda. During this period, thousands of civilians in 
northern Uganda were massacred, and over 10,000 children abducted by the LRA. The 
Ugandan government also engaged the group in a series of peace talks that never 
materialized. It was in 2006 that the group relocated to the DRC and later scattered to 
Sudan, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic, where it still operates.14  
The LRA may not pose a direct threat to the United States, but the group’s 
activities in Central Africa have been a concern to the U.S. policy makers interested in 
improving regional security and peace building. To this end, on November 24, 2010, 
President Barack Obama spelled out the U.S. counter-LRA strategic plan to Congress. 
                                                 
12 Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, Sowing the Mustard Seed: The Struggle for Freedom and Democracy in 
Uganda (Kampala, Uganda: Moran Publishers, 2010), 180. 
13 Issaka K. Souare, “The International Criminal Court and African Conflicts: The Case of Uganda,” 
Review of African Political Economy 36, no. 121 (2009): 369–88, http://dx.doi.org?10.1080/
03056240903211083. 
14 Jonathan Fisher, “Framing Kony: Uganda’s War, Obama’s Advisers and the Nature of ‘Influence’ 
in Western Foreign Policy Making,” Third World Quarterly 35, no. 4 (2014): 686–704. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1080/01436597.2014.924068. 
 5 
The objectives of the strategic plan included: “(a) increase protection of civilians; (b) 
apprehend or remove from the battlefield Joseph Kony and senior commanders; (c) 
promote the defection, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of remaining LRA 
fighters; and (d) increase humanitarian access and provide continued relief to affected 
communities.”15 Subsequently, in 2012, the United States deployed around 100 troops in 
the Central African Republic to partner with the African Union Regional Task Force 
(AU-RTF) in operations to eliminate the LRA.16 Without such sustained pressure, the 
LRA has the potential to destabilize a wider region. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are different bodies of literature that deal with the ungoverned spaces. One 
such body of literature as expounded by Beckett and others focuses on the relationship 
between terrorist groups and ungoverned spaces. For example, Beckett notes that in 
societies or regions “where the state system has remained underdeveloped—as in many 
parts of Africa, Asia and Latin America”—insurgencies tend to be prevalent. He observes 
that out of 55 conflicts that were ongoing in 2001, “40 percent were in Africa; 35 percent, 
in Asia; and 15 percent, in the Middle East.”17 He mentions other facilitating factors for 
insurgencies like “difficult terrain (mountain, desert, forest, swamp, and jungle)” 
especially when this terrain has been mastered by the rebels. External support and young 
unemployed populations are also considered as enabling factors for insurgents.18 This 
line of investigation indicates that if such regions were stable and well managed, then 
terrorists would not thrive. 
                                                 
15 Andre LeSage, Countering the Lord’s Resistance Army in Central Africa, Strategic Forum, no. 270 
(Washington, DC: National Defense University, July 2011) http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/
stratforum/SF-270.pdf. 
16 Surdasan Raghavan and Craig Whitlock, “The Hunt for Joseph Kony, Elusive African Warlord, Is 
Halted,” Washington Post, April 3, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/hunt-for-elusive-african-
warlord-halted/2013/04/03/833cc0dc-9c81-11e2-9219-51eb8387e8f1_story.html. 




Arsenault and Bacon also highlight factors that may encourage terrorist groups to 
thrive, including ungoverned spaces, by quoting the 2006 U.S. National Security 
Strategy: 
Regional conflicts can arise from a wide variety of causes, including poor 
governance, external aggression, competing claims, internal revolt, tribal 
rivalries, and ethnic or religious hatred. If left unaddressed, however, these 
different causes lead to the same: failed states, humanitarian disasters, and 
ungoverned areas that can become safe havens for terrorists.19 
To be sure, other scholars argue that considering the U.S. intervention in Iraq and 
Afghanistan after 9/11 and the state in which these two countries and the region find 
themselves today, the premise of ungoverned spaces and terrorism proliferation is a 
fallacy. David Oakley and Pat Proctor, in their article, “Ten Years of GWOT, the Failure 
of Democratization, and the Fallacy of ‘Ungoverned Spaces,’” acknowledge that while 
Afghanistan was used to launch terrorist attacks on the United States a decade and a half 
ago, contemporary terrorist organizations who have exposure to available modern means 
of communication might not need Afghanistan as a country to build their terror 
machinery.20 They quote Marc Sageman’s book Leaderless Jihad, for example, to argue 
that in its operations, Al Qaeda does not derive its power from the dominance of territory, 
but rather from its ability to command a large following using various media channels 
like videos and the Internet.21 The authors further note that “terrorist organizations 
operating out of remote and truly ungoverned areas would have great difficulty 
communicating with subordinates or anyone else.”22 In other words, a weak or failing 
state may no longer offer insurgencies or terrorists groups what they seek in a base of 
operations.  
                                                 
19 Elizabeth Grimm Arsenault and Tricia Bacon, “Disaggregating and Defeating Terrorist Safe 
Havens,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 38, no. 2 (2015): 85–112, http://dx.org/10.1080/
1057610X.2014.977605. 
20 David Oakley and Patrick Proctor, “Ten Years of GWOT, the Failure of Democratization and the 
Fallacy of ‘Ungoverned Spaces,’” Journal of Strategic Security 5, no. 1 (2012): 1–14, 
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol5/iss 1/5.  
21 Ibid. See also Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terrorist Networks in the Twenty-First Century 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).  
22 Ibid. 
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On the other hand, terrorist groups like Islamic State (ISIS)23 and Boko Haram24 
have some territories under their control and are intent on creating “caliphates,” which in 
essence entail the control and administration of large territories. The LRA also clearly 
makes use of the gaps in lawful control of the territory through which it ranges to mount 
its attacks and sustain its members. 
As such, this study proceeds from the starting assertion that territory and control 
matter in twenty-first–century counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. In this 
connection, this section examines the use of the term “ungoverned spaces,” the link 
between failed states and ungoverned spaces, and the importance of the state’s will to 
counter insurgency. It goes on to explore the perhaps key factor in addressing ungoverned 
spaces and the security problems they foster: state capacity and the will to counter 
insurgency. 
1. Ungoverned Spaces 
There are various factors likely to favor the growth and thriving of terrorist 
groups in Africa, which have been captured by the literature. According to Robert 
Feldman,25 such factors include large unemployed populations of youths who are likely 
to fall prey to terrorist recruiters, haphazard borders that are poorly manned, and the 
proliferation of arms due to unending conflicts and poor governance, among others. 
Within this context, scholars note that in the current major insurgencies on the African 
continent from Somalia to Nigeria, and from Mali to the Central African Republic, the 
problem of ungoverned spaces also seems to play a central role. Indeed, Elizabeth 
Arsenault and Tricia Bacon prefer to call ungoverned spaces “safe havens.” They further 
note how various other scholars perceive ungoverned spaces.26  
                                                 
23 Graeme Wood, “What ISIS Really Wants,” Atlantic, March 2015. http://www.theatlantic.com/
magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/.  
24 Farouk Chouthia, “Who Are Nigeria’s Boko Haram Islamists?” BBC, May 4, 2015. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13809501. 
25 Robert L. Feldman, “The Root Causes of Terrorism: Why Parts of Africa Might Never Be at 
Peace,” Defense and Security Analysis 25, no. 4 (2009): 355–72, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/
14751790903416707. 
26 Arsenault and Bacon, “Disaggregating and Defeating Terrorist Safe Havens,” 87-88. 
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For example, they mention Rem Korteweg’s definition of “terrorist sanctuaries” 
in his work on “Black Holes” as “areas in which non-state militant organizations are able 
to undertake activities in support of terrorist operations,” while Cristiana C.B. Kittner’s 
scholarship defines them as “geographic spaces where Islamic terrorists are able to 
successfully establish an organization and operation base to conduct activities.”27 In this 
regard, it is important therefore “to understand havens as places in which terrorist groups 
can operate without fear of counter terror retaliation or pressure” from governments.28 
Furthermore, Arsenault and Bacon note that although the U.S. government has a 
variety of definitions of “safe havens,” all these definitions point to one maxim “that safe 
havens exist where groups have freedom to undertake core support activities with relative 
security or limited fear of counterterrorism action.”29 For example, the two scholars 
quote President Barack Obama in one of his addresses in 2013 on terrorists and safe 
havens: 
I am very concerned about Syria becoming an enclave for extremists, 
because extremists thrive in chaos. They thrive in failed states. They thrive 
in power vacuums. They don’t have much to offer when it comes to 
actually building things, but they’re very good about exploiting situations 
that are no longer functioning. They fill that gap.30   
So the problem, from Arsenault and Bacon’s perspective, is less that U.S. policy 
makers fail to recognize safe havens as a problem. Rather, they argue, the wrong 
prescriptions might be applied if the typology of these safe havens is not known. They 
argue that sanctuaries are three pronged; government-enabled, government-sponsored, 
and those that are contested.  
Arsenault and Bacon note that although multiple definitions of weak states exist, 
it is a common ground that all these weak states experience “systemic weakness.” They 
therefore posit that “fragile states, crisis states, post conflict states, failing states, and 
failed states” all translate to three key features that characterize weak states. These 
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include: “(1) a government’s inability or refusal to ensure security within and on its 
borders; (2) a failure to provide basic services to the populace; and (3) a lack of 
legitimacy among the populace.”31 In these conditions, non-state actors find an enabling 
environment to operate from.32  
Under the government-enabled sanctuary, the state may have limited capacity to 
deny a safe haven to a terrorist group, while at the same time being supportive of its 
sanctuary if the state has used the terrorist group before as a proxy. This situation is 
exemplified by the Pakistani Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT), operating in the Kashmir territory 
against India. The government-sponsored sanctuary implies that the government could 
deny a terrorist group sanctuary, but it decides not to. Sudan has supported such groups 
before. In the case of the contested sanctuary, the government may oppose the terrorist 
group within its territory but lack the necessary means to eradicate that group. “The 
Afghan Taliban and Islamic Court Union’s takeovers in Afghanistan and Somalia 
respectively” offer appropriate examples.33  
According to Arsenault and Bacon, the typologies each necessitate a particular 
approach to combating such terrorist groups. They argue that in government-enabled 
havens, the United States could apply targeted sanctions, while in government-sponsored 
havens, the United States could use aerial strikes or regime change. In contested havens, 
they add, the United States can provide capacity building to the country affected or 
support military interventions by other governments to get rid of the terrorist group.34   
In their book, Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured 
World, Ghani and Lockhart link ungoverned spaces with lack of effective state 
institutions. Specifically, they contend that “an effective state is necessary for the solution 
of both local and global problems” and observe that for the past 40 years, Africa has had 
difficulties in security, political, and economic spheres emanating from weak governance 
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and the absence of an effective state.35 They argue that these problems are not limited to 
Africa—they note that other countries like Haiti, East Timor, Afghanistan, Iraq, and 
Nepal, among others, fall in the same category and warn that failure by the international 
community to fix these states spells doom for the rest of the world. According to Ghani 
and Lockhart: 
State failures that the rich countries used to be able to ignore can thus no 
longer be overlooked. Intrastate and interstate conflict, drug rings, and the 
smuggling of arms, timber, antiquities, and precious stones—combined 
with money laundering and the large-scale, speedy financial transactions 
made possible by globalization—are resulting in an agile and flexible 
complex of networks that mostly thwart any attempt to create order. … 
Criminal networks are making their way into the first world, with 
consequences of increased violence, human trafficking, and, at worst, the 
threat of terrorism.36 
Zaitseva also argues that ungoverned spaces and failed states can both serve in 
acquisition and trafficking of radioactive materials and the devices made with these 
materials.37 She gives an example of the DRC, which is a uranium-rich African county 
that ranks sixth on the List of Failed States Index of 2008. The DRC has been visited by 
North Koreans and other foreign nationals who investigated the possibilities of exporting 
uranium from a closed mine in Katanga province.38 This incident indicates the gravity of 
the problem of ungoverned spaces and failed states in undermining national and 
international security. 
Other scholars like Ken Menkhaus, though, acknowledge that ungoverned spaces 
and state failure are interrelated; he argues that the problem is over-hyped by policy 
makers. Menkhaus contends that where state failure has occurred as in Afghanistan, the 
DRC, and Somalia, the communities in such states are not merely passive victims of state 
failure and collapse. The communities can forge systems of security, law, deterrence of 
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crime, conflict management, and mutual support, offering services including armed 
neighborhood watch groups.39 Menkhaus says that sometimes terrorists are able to 
organize and carry out attacks in weak states but not necessarily failed ones.  
He gives the Horn of Africa as an example. Menkhaus argues that when East 
Africa Al Qaeda (EAAQ) operatives ventured into Somalia in 1990s, they found it 
insecure and divided on clans, which posed a logistical challenge for them to operate as 
foreigners. They instead put cells in Kenya, which was a weak, corrupt, but functional 
state, and it is from there that they were able to spring up and bomb U.S. embassies in 
Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998.40  
Menkhaus’ argument is logically right, but it does not take into consideration the 
long-term agenda of terrorists and their desire to create “provinces” that they can use to 
destabilize the world. The current trends in ISIS operations indicate that various groups 
like Boko Haram in Nigeria and Ansar Bayt al Maqdis in Egypt have declared affiliation 
to the Islamic State, while at the same time fighting their home governments.41 
Ian Beckett also puts it clearly that in modern conflict, “the key to insurgency 
success is no longer the ability to wage protracted warfare, but the ability to establish a 
base rapidly and move on the capital city, which is the only focus of power in so many 
states in the developing world.”42 Based on Beckett’s observation, there is no doubt that 
Al Qaeda–linked Al-Shabaab at some period controlled Mogadishu and wanted to take 
over the whole of Somalia. It was the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) that 
stopped them.43 This episode demonstrates a changing trend in strategy especially 
propagated by ISIS and other like-minded terrorist groups as observed by Byman, where 
control and expansion of territory is becoming a norm. This change in approach, Byman 
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adds, is ideological in that by creating an Islamic state under Islamic law, many followers 
get inspiration and embrace the group. Besides controlling a territory, the group can build 
an army and use the same army for further expansion.44  
There are other scholars who have approached the issue of ungoverned spaces in a 
broader way to include cyberspace, outer space, maritime, and airspace. Though these 
spaces have national and international legal frameworks to govern them, the nature of 
their existence and usage create loopholes, thus creating areas of contest. Scott Jasper and 
Paul Giarra have called the four spaces global commons—the term that originates from 
the old English law that refers to “a tract of ground shared by residents of a village, 
belonging to no one, and held for the good of all.”45 Jasper and Giarra argue that whereas 
the global commons facilitate physically and virtually “free flow of trade, finance, 
information, people and technology in the world’s economic system,” they at the same 
time aid “transfer of advanced weapons and military technology; the spread of ideas and 
ideologies; the movement and communication of criminals and terrorists; and the 
diversion of dangerous materials.”46 The two scholars counsel that a defense approach 
that identifies the capabilities required to counter such threats should be in place to foster 
such a security environment.  
2. State Capacity and the Will to Counter Insurgency 
There is another body of literature that highlights state capacity and the will to 
counter terrorist groups in certain countries. For example, Stewart Patrick notes that 
“states lacking effective economic institutions are more likely to suffer from stagnant 
growth, breed political extremism and be unable to regulate terrorist financing.”47 He 
notes, however, that in an effort to strengthen states that are tending toward failure and 
shield them from transnational terrorism, policy makers should differentiate between 
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capacities and will. He argues that whereas countries, in the Sahel region or East Africa, 
for example, may be willing to fight terrorism, they might lack the tools to do so, while 
countries like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia may lack the determination to tackle jihad 
groups in their countries for fear of upsetting already radicalized populations.48 
In light of this argument, it becomes clear that ungoverned spaces—whether in 
states that are willing or not willing to be helped in eliminating terrorist groups from such 
spaces—remain potential security threats for the afflicted states, the regions where they 
are located, and the international community. Patrick calls such states bad neighbors—
where state structures have collapsed and the borders are porous and can export violence, 
refugees, political instability, and economic disorganization to other states in their 
vicinity.49 
The same argument is further highlighted by Ray Takeyh and Nikolas Gvosdev 
when they assert that “today’s terrorist does not need a strong state to provide funding 
and supplies. Rather, it seeks a weak state that cannot impede a group’s freedom of action 
but has the veneer of state sovereignty that prevents other, stronger states from taking 
effective countermeasures.”50 
Similarly, in their discussion on fixing failed states, Ghani and Lockhart propose a 
framework based on what they call the ten functions of the state that complement each 
other for the state to be sound. These functions include “a monopoly of the legitimate 
means of violence; administrative control; sound management of public finances; 
investment in human capital; creation of citizenship rights through social policy; 
provision of infrastructure services; formation of a market; management of public assets; 
effective public borrowing; and the sovereignty dividend and the sovereignty gap.”51  
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A failed state cannot realize these functions on its own, however, and that is 
where intervention measures come into play. Ulrich Schneckener identifies four 
strategies that are usually undertaken by international organizations, transnational NGOs, 
and third-party states in the stabilization process of failed states. He names these 
strategies as “Liberalization First, Security First, Institutionalization First, and Civil 
Society First.”52 Schneckener explains that each one of these strategies is always chosen 
first unconsciously during the period of intervention because internally each strategy has 
its advocates in different administrative units such as ministries, departments, or agencies 
of the United Nations. He argues that each strategy has its strength and weaknesses but 
though not mutually exclusive, are rather complementary and interdependent, and the 
success of them all relies on implementation.53 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Andrew Mack, in his work, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of 
Asymmetric Conflict,” states that in guerrilla warfare, “the ‘people sea’ forms a sanctuary 
of popular support for the ‘guerrilla fish.’”54 Mack gives the American war in Vietnam of 
1968 as an example of the “people sea,” implying that in guerrilla warfare, the guerrilla 
army can decide to buy time as long as they have the support of the population, which in 
the long run could lead them to victory.55  
He also gives the example of the Algerian war of independence against France 
between 1954 and 1962, which also features in the people power theory. Terrorism was 
used as a weapon against France, forcing it to react with an iron hand, thus achieving for 
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the Algerian rebels what they had been unable to achieve themselves: “the political 
mobilization of the masses against the French.”56 Unlike the Maoist type, the 
contemporary insurgents that sprung up especially after the end of Cold War have 
transformed into transnational terrorist networks that operate across state borders. Such 
groups tend to rely heavily on the use of violence against civilians for purposes ranging 
from attracting attention, coerced support, and sometimes a draconian response from 
governments.57  
The LRA, which started its rebellion in Uganda in 1986, had used Sudan as a 
launch pad. Other rebel groups which operated in northern Uganda like the Uganda 
People’s Democratic Army (UPDA) and the Holy Spirit Movement either were defeated 
or surrendered but not the LRA. Is it not possible that what motivated LRA to carry on 
with the war was getting support from the Sudan government in the form of arms and 
bases?58 It is therefore plausible to contend that the LRA could have been neutralized in 
its infancy, like other armed groups that emerged in the 1980s in northern Uganda, had it 
not been the presence of ungoverned spaces that played in its favor. 
In addition, as it is reflected in the literature review, various factors like 
unemployment of young populations, porous borders, religious extremism and bad 
governance, among other factors, are always at play in the growth and survival of 
terrorist groups in areas that they operate from. This study does not imply that 
ungoverned spaces are the ultimate or most important factor in this phenomenon. The 
study, however, examines the role of ungoverned spaces, which seems critical to 
understanding the dynamics of the survival of terrorist groups. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
In an effort to determine the extent to which ungoverned spaces contribute to the 
survival of terrorist organizations in Africa, I observe and examine how the LRA has 
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utilized the ungoverned spaces from its inception up to the present and how this 
utilization has helped it to survive. I also analyze the three terrorist organizations—that 
is, Al-Shabaab, AQIM, and Boko Haram—that share most of the essential features as 
those of the LRA. The analysis of these terrorist organizations provides a wider scope in 
understanding the role of ungoverned spaces among other factors in the survival of 
terrorist groups in Africa. In addition, I also use other scholarly information that is related 
to my study, policy documents, and think tank and NGO reports that highlight the impact 
of these terrorist groups in areas of their operation and policy approaches that have been 
employed to address the threats. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The thesis comprises five chapters. The first chapter includes the introduction, 
with background information on insurgents, state failure, and ungoverned spaces and how 
the three relate to each other. The second chapter contains an examination of how the 
LRA has utilized ungoverned spaces to survive from its inception up to date. In the third 
chapter, an analysis of three terrorist groups is presented, with a focus on Al-Shabaab, 
AQIM, and Boko Haram. In this analysis, besides ungoverned spaces, a number of 
factors that have enabled survival of these groups are examined, including state 
weakness/failure, territorial usage, organizational leadership, military organization, 
internal and external support, motivation and survival/self-preservation. 
Subsequently, Chapter Four focuses on the evaluation of policy frameworks that 
have been put in place to address the problem of ungoverned spaces. And finally, Chapter 
Five synthesizes the findings of the study and suggests how they can inform policy and 
strategy in neutralizing terrorist groups in Africa. 
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II. THE ORIGINS AND GROWTH OF THE LRA IN UGANDA 
Uganda currently enjoys a peaceful security environment throughout its territory, 
but this peacefulness is a relatively recent achievement. In 2006, the national army—
Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF)—managed to push the LRA from northern 
Uganda, heralding this new pacific phase. For its part, the rebel group relocated to the 
DRC, continuing its exploitation of ungoverned spaces, now outside Uganda’s national 
borders.  
Especially in the 1980s, Uganda itself represented an ungoverned or, at best, a 
weakly governed space. Amid this lack of effective state control, the LRA thrived. It 
thrived because Uganda was emerging from a long history of instability, and South Sudan 
had been at war with North Sudan since the 1980s. These two situations played a vital 
role in the growth of the LRA, because it used ungoverned spaces that existed in South 
Sudan and a nascent security apparatus in Uganda that at the time could not eliminate the 
group. This chapter, therefore, examines and observes how ungoverned spaces aided the 
spread and survival of the LRA in Central Africa, the survival dynamics employed by the 
group through exploitation of ungoverned spaces, and approaches in combating it at 
national, regional, and international levels. 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND  
Uganda’s struggles with governability have historic roots. During British rule, 
Uganda was divided into territories—the Bantu from the south and the Nilotic from the 
north. The British considered people from northern Uganda as martial and fit for armed 
forces and physical labor, while those from the south were held to be more apt for civil 
service, as they had benefited early in education offered by missionaries. The colonial 
leadership administered the territory according to these cherished stereotypes, in keeping 
with the British penchant for “divide and conquer.”59 Indeed, during the colonial period, 
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there was an unwritten rule that soldiers must hail from the north, civil servants must be 
from the south, and Asians were to run businesses.60 For the 68 years of the British rule, 
divide and rule in Uganda capitalized on the ethnic diversity in the country. This division 
was meant to ease administration of the colony.  
After independence in 1962, this division persisted and, indeed, affected the 
integration of Uganda as nation. Uganda’s first prime minister was Milton Obote from 
the north. Under his rule, by 1969, the northerners, who accounted for 19 percent of the 
population, comprised 61 percent of the army.61 At the same time, the Baganda, who 
come from central Uganda, constituted only five percent of the Ugandan army, although 
they represented more than 16 percent of the population. This kind of imbalance was the 
same in the police force that had been built by the colonial government. For example in 
1961, a year before independence, 15.5 percent of the police force was from Acholi 
(northern region)—even though the Acholi represented 4.4 percent of the country’s 
population. The Iteso (north east) made up 15.2 percent of the force but just 8.1 percent 
of the population. The Langi (northern region) constituted 7.5 percent of the force but 
only 5.6 percent of the general population. Meanwhile, no single southern or Bantu-
speaking group constituted more than 5 percent of the police force. This imbalance in 
numbers was echoed in the correctional and secret services.62  
Obote was content to continue with this mal-distribution because by that time, the 
coercive elements of the state were used as a means to maintain political power. Those 
who controlled the means of violence were able to dictate terms to those who were not 
armed.63 Ultimately, this imbalance created social disorder, which, in the long run, bred 
violence.  
In 1971, in a military coup, Obote’s army commander Idi Amin—from the 
northwest of Uganda—took over the country. Amin set about eliminating Obote’s ethnic 
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constituency, who were rivals amid the colonial divisions, especially from the armed 
forces. Amin carried out targeted killings mainly from Obote’s region; later on, however, 
the killings spread to other parts of the country to include any other Ugandans who 
opposed Amin. Despite Amin’s authoritarian pretensions, Uganda was, in these years, 
ungoverned in the sense that the rule of law was largely absent. For the eight years that 
Amin ruled Uganda, he ruled by decree. All political institutions such as parliament and 
district and town councils were suspended and all political activities banned.64  
During his second year in office, he expelled all Asians from Uganda, even 
though they demonstrably formed the engine of Uganda’s economy, dominating the 
commercial and industrial class. The Asians who were affected by the expulsion 
numbered about 75,000 of Indo-Pakistani origin, some of which held British passports; 
the majority were Ugandan citizens since they had been born in Uganda to migrant 
parents.65 This community of Asians used to run shops, large-scale farms, and plantations 
of sugar, tea, and other enterprises. Indeed the expulsion of Asians led to total economic 
breakdown, including lack of essential basic commodities like sugar, soap, and salt 
throughout the country. Amin pursued his paranoid domestic policies with increasing—
and increasingly lethal—vigor. It is estimated that by the time Amin was overthrown, he 
had killed around 300,000 people in his eight-year rule.66 
The political opposition to Amin that existed was therefore largely those living in 
exile. The majority of them were based in Tanzania, including Obote. By 1978, the 
tension between Uganda and Tanzania was high as Amin accused President Julius 
Nyerere of supporting dissidents against his government. When Amin’s army later 
attacked the Tanzanian border town of Mutukula, claiming to repulse Ugandan 
dissidents, the Tanzanian army responded forcefully and swiftly.67 
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Amin was overthrown in 1979 by a combined force of Ugandan refugees and the 
Tanzanian army. The defeat of Amin by the Tanzanian army and Ugandan refugees was 
received with relief both locally and internationally because Amin had turned Uganda 
into a failed state. His departure was seen as an opportunity to restore a collapsed state. 
Obote became president again in 1980, but the process did not restore peace and stability 
to Uganda. The elections that brought Obote to power were thought to have been rigged. 
Yoweri Museveni was among the presidential candidates in this disputed election. 
Aggrieved at the outcome of the vote, Museveni immediately inaugurated a guerrilla war 
in central Uganda that dragged on for five years between Museveni’s National Resistance 
Army (NRA) and the government force—Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA).  
In 1985, the government army, divided and fatigued by the insurgency, overthrew 
Obote again in an effort to establish peace and restore stability to Uganda. Obote’s army 
commander, Tito Okello, also from northern Uganda, became the president and tried to 
negotiate with Museveni. The Nairobi Peace Talks between Okello and Museveni were 
mediated by Kenyan president Daniel arap Moi. At the time of these talks, Museveni 
forces controlled much of central and western Uganda while UNLA controlled Kampala, 
east, and northern Uganda. Unlike Museveni, who had full control of the guerrilla forces 
that he had commanded for five years, some of Okello’s sections of the army were 
involved in looting and killing people in and around Kampala. The behavior of Okello’s 
army became an issue during the peace talks as Museveni threatened that whereas he had 
signed the Nairobi accord, he would not hesitate to continue fighting if looting and killing 
of civilians by the government army did not stop.68 Second, though the Nairobi accord 
had guaranteed Museveni 50 percent of the seats on the ruling Supreme Council of 
Okello, Museveni was skeptical about the deal because he did not want to associate with 
a group that was considered sectarian and neocolonial.69 The peace talks collapsed, and 
in January 1986, Museveni’s forces overran Kampala. At last, he became president70—
and sundry rebellions broke out almost immediately.  
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The LRA was one of these rebel groups, determined to recapture political power 
from Museveni. Tellingly, Museveni is a son of southwestern Uganda whom the rebel 
groups from the northern region of Uganda perceived as a threat to their political and 
military dominance.71  
At the same time, when Museveni’s NRA defeated the forces of Tito Okello, the 
UNLA retreated to Sudan across a poorly guarded border. The UNLA forces later 
mobilized with support from the Sudanese government and attacked the northern 
Ugandan border areas in 1986.72 Apparently, Sudan’s government wanted to help the 
defeated UNLA soldiers to recapture power in Uganda so that in return, the UNLA would 
help the Sudanese army to deal with the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), which 
was fighting for independence of South Sudan at the time.73 The SPLA was dominant in 
most parts of South Sudan during this period, but it did not have effective control of the 
whole territory. The government in Khartoum therefore could use this vacuum to 
mobilize and arm the UNLA.  
Once established in northern Uganda, the UNLA later transformed into the Holy 
Spirit Movement (HSM) led by Alice Lakwena. Lakwena’s forces were defeated in 1987, 
and she fled to Kenya, where she later died. After Lakwena’s defeat, her cousin, Joseph 
Kony, formed the remnants of her forces into the LRA. Kony styled his forces as a 
Christian army and declared at the onset that his aim was “to overthrow the government 
in Kampala and rule Uganda based on Ten Commandments.”74   
Between 1987 and 2006, the LRA kept moving to and from Sudan to carry out 
attacks in Uganda. This movement of the LRA was possible because of the porous 
borders that existed between Uganda and Sudan. (During this period, thousands of 
civilians in northern Uganda were massacred, and more than 10,000 children were 
abducted by the LRA to serve as soldiers in the ongoing struggle. The Ugandan 
government tried to engage the group in a series of peace talks, which never 
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materialized.) In 2006, the group relocated to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC); 
after it was attacked by the UPDF and other regional armies, it scattered to Sudan, South 
Sudan, and the Central African Republic,75 where it still operates to date.  
B. RELIGION AND HIERARCHY IN THE LRA  
Joseph Kony realized from the beginning that if he had to get and keep command 
and control of his followers, he had to use religion.76 Born in the early 1960s in a village 
called Odek, Kony did not complete primary education; instead he spent his formative 
years serving as an altar boy at his local church.77 He was raised as a Catholic but later he 
ventured into practicing traditional medicine, a trade he learned from his brother.78 When 
he assumed the LRA leadership, he proclaimed himself a messianic prophet. It is ironic 
that a group that was planning to use the Ten Commandments as its constitution so 
flagrantly disregarded the tenet of “thou shalt not kill.” Instead, the LRA preached one 
thing and practiced rather another. 
This tension between the spirit and the practice is not new to the LRA. The Irish 
Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland used religion for mobilization and as an alibi 
for its violence. When, at the height of the IRA conflict, Billy Wright, a protestant 
paramilitarist convicted of charges related to terrorism, was asked by BBC journalist 
Martin Dillon whether the Irish conflict was a “religious war,” Wright told Dillon that 
“religion is part of the equation.”79 By implication, Wright and his colleagues who 
professed the same faith—Protestants—were ready to die in the conflict as long as what 
they were fighting for reflected the ideals of their religion.80 To be sure, the Catholics in 
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Northern Ireland also used religion for mobilization and motivation. Father Denis Faul 
was quoted saying that “the Catholic culture of the Irish gave them the ability to kill and 
be killed since death ‘is a sacrifice’ and ‘the opportunity of forgiveness’ lessens the guilt 
involved in killing.”81   
Likewise, the leader of the LRA Joseph Kony used spiritualism to control his 
fighters. From the beginning, Kony claimed to have been possessed by a number of 
spirits. He made his fighters believe that he reached all his decisions through the direction 
of spirits. He told his fighters that the rules of the LRA were imposed by the spirits and 
that adherence to these rules would bring victory on the battlefield—while lack of 
adherence attracted punishment in the form of death on the battlefield.82 In preparation 
for battle, Kony would smear his fighters with Moo ya (shea nut oil), claiming it would 
protect them from bullets. This kind of ritual gave Kony’s soldiers courage and 
motivation to fight, even in the face of government forces that were better equipped and 
superior in numbers. Allen and Vlassenroot quote one of the LRA commanders, 
explaining about the anointing rituals before going into battle, thus: 
The Holy Spirit reported to the chairman [Kony], who selected the soldiers 
who could be on “stand-by.” He picked the controllers. He ordered them 
to mix this kind of herbs, mixed them in powder form, put them in a basin 
together with water and Moo ya. The controllers stand near the basin and 
splash the soldier, one by one. When the soldiers are near the basin, they 
put their gun three times in the basin, and women four times. You put the 
gun up and you say ‘God, you are stronger than anything in the world; 
therefore the power belongs to you.’ We also sing songs like “Polo Polo” 
[“Heaven should come to rescue us in our lives, and we shall never leave 
the way to heaven”], because when we sing, we do not even hear 
gunshots! When you finish, you cannot believe what you have done. You 
say: what has happened, how did I do all this? It is as if you are not the 
one who did it! It is a force which you have in you: it gives you courage 
and strength! … All the spirits are with Kony, but if you are going to the 
battle, you feel that something is with you. In the battlefield, they will be 
doing their duty and take care of you: everyone will feel very strong.83  
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One of the commanders who surrendered to the government after 17 years with 
Kony also confirmed that Kony used to tell his soldiers that he was doing what God told 
him to do. Major Jackson Achama quoted Kony as saying, “When a generation rejects a 
prophet, any crime committed against them is not a crime.”84 Such statements were 
meant to justify raiding, stealing, mutilation, and killing of people from his community in 
northern Uganda. Achama emphatically told researchers that he had realized that Kony 
would never give up fighting “until people accept him as a prophet, or he is killed.”85  
By early 2000, the LRA had grown into a major force divided into four brigades. 
Each brigade numbered 300 to 800 soldiers organized into three battalions. Battalions 
had their own commanders and below them, small units each headed by a field 
commander. Each unit had a provision for a “‘religious officer’ responsible for prayer, 
fasting, and other spiritual duties.”86  
During raids, the units would split further into small units for easy mobility and 
concealment from government soldiers.87 This tactic was favorable to the group because 
of the vast bushes in northern Uganda and South Sudan, which the LRA had to traverse 
to conduct its operations. Most times, the composition of those units included women and 
children as well, whose role was mainly to carry food and other equipment. 
C. LRA’S TERROR IN NORTHERN UGANDA  
Although the LRA was organized on military lines, its actual operational 
repertoire was heavy on terrorism and attacks on noncombatant civilian populations. Just 
as Mao admonished “Kill just one and frighten ten thousand others,”88 the LRA used 
terror in the areas it operated from to garner support. Wickham-Crowley notes in “Terror 
and Guerrilla Warfare in Latin America” that rebel forces usually employ terror to solicit 
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compliance from the peasants.89 In the same vein, when the LRA realized that it had little 
support from the population—indeed, some of the local people were joining the Local 
Defense Units set up by the government—the LRA retaliated by carrying out massacres 
in the north and northeast of the country with great brutality. In other instances, the LRA 
cut off “lips, ears, noses, fingers, and hands” of people. In one incident, a 17-year old 
boy’s ears, lips and fingers were chopped off and placed in an envelope together with a 
letter reading: “We shall do to you what we have done to him.”90 It was a message to the 
local people to cease their support for the government.  
The atrocities were always accompanied by abductions. By the time the group 
fled to DRC in 2006, about 20,000 children had been abducted, according to Human 
Rights Watch reports.91 In one such raid in 1996 at Aboke Girls School in Lira, the LRA 
abducted “139 girls between the ages of twelve and fifteen” in the middle of the night and 
vanished with them into the bush. The headmistress of the school, Sister Rachele Fassera, 
followed the rebels into the bush and pleaded for their release. She secured 109, while 30 
remained in captivity.92  
It is believed that the rebels who abducted the Aboke girls insisted on taking some 
to Kony specifically because he had commanded them to do so. One of Kony’s wives 
who was rescued in a battle encounter with government forces told researchers that at a 
certain period, Kony had at least 50 wives and fathered 100 children in the bush. Lily 
Adong, who was 25 years old with three children, was forced into rebel activities when 
she was barely 10 years old and spent more than a decade of her youth in captivity.93  
Such incidents were many in villages, where young boys and girls were abducted. 
Young girls used to be handed over to soldiers as rewards. During the height of the 
insurgency, AIDS also posed a big health issue in Uganda. The LRA knew the dangers of 
AIDS, and given that they could not afford proper functioning health facilities in the 
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jungles where they operated, they mitigated the AIDS threat by preferring forced 
marriages to very young girls, whom, they reasoned, were unlikely to have the disease as 
they had not yet become sexually active.  
Realizing that it was difficult to provide security for each and every homestead 
against the LRA’s abductions and killings, the government designated camps for 
displaced persons in the north, where civilians lived under the protection of the army. 
Although this measure minimized abductions and killings, at times, such camps were 
attacked by the rebels, particularly if they realized that the government forces were thin 
on the ground. For example in one single attack on a camp called Barlonyo in 2004, 
around 300 LRA rebels attacked the camp that housed about 5,000 people. They ordered 
everyone to enter their grass-thatched houses and set the camp on fire. Anyone who tried 
to escape was shot. By the time the rebels retreated, about 300 civilians were dead in 
what became known in the history of the insurgency as the Barlonyo Massacre.94 
D. UGANDA’S ATTEMPT AT PEACE TALKS WITH THE LRA 
There were periods when Uganda’s government and the LRA held peace talks, 
headed by Uganda’s minister of state resident in Gulu, Betty Bigombe. (Her role was to 
bring about reconciliation and reconstruction in northern Uganda.) In one such session in 
1993, Kony delegated elders and religious leaders to meet with Bigombe and indicated 
that the LRA needed six months to consult its scattered forces before they could declare a 
cease-fire. It is believed that the LRA used this period to replenish its weapons with 
support from Sudan’s government. Either way, the peace talks collapsed amid such bad 
faith.95 
Another attempt at peace talks was made in 2006, this time mediated by then-vice 
president of South Sudan, Dr. Riek Machar. The talks took place in Juba, the capital of 
what is now South Sudan, which was considered neutral for both parties. Although Kony 
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did not go to Juba for the talks himself, he sent a delegation. At some point during the 
peace talks, all delegations went to a place called Ri-Kwangba in South Sudan at the 
border with the DRC, where Kony himself joined the talks. The previous year, the LRA’s 
top five commanders, including Kony, had been indicted by the International Criminal 
Court (ICC).96 While some pundits thought that the weight of the ICC charges was 
forcing the LRA to negotiate, it turned out that the looming indictment cast a long 
shadow on the Juba peace process. Kony feared that even if he signed the agreement and 
surrendered, the ICC would still arrest him and take him to The Hague, so he had little 
incentive to ink any kind of cease-fire with the Ugandan government.  
However, Kony also had by that time moved all his forces into Garamba National 
Park in the DRC, where he set up bases; this relocation was a further disincentive for the 
LRA to sign the peace deal. Garamba Park encompasses some 4,900 square kilometers, 
and it is rich in flora and fauna that insurgents could depend on for food and shelter.97 
The remoteness of this park was also an added advantage since it provided the LRA time 
to recuperate, train, and reorganize itself more or less with impunity. Eventually, Kony 
refused to sign the accord, and these peace talks collapsed as well.98 
One aspect that came out of the failed peace talks was that the outside world 
became better acquainted with the persona of Kony, who granted interviews to the 
international media and researchers. Prior to these interviews, a number of people 
doubted whether Kony even existed. Kony used these interviews to state that he was not 
involved in terrorism, instead describing himself as a “freedom fighter.”99 Considering 
the atrocities that are synonymous with his organization, his rants were not taken 
seriously. 
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The collapse of the talks allowed the regional armies to launch a war that was 
intended to uproot the LRA from the jungles of the DRC. It also led to division within 
rebel ranks. Kony had delegated most of the peace process to his deputy Vincent Otti, but 
eventually, Kony came to believe Otti was intent on overthrowing him using the peace 
process. Kony later executed Otti in 2007. In the same year, the LRA’s chief of military 
operations called Opiyo Makasi, and commander Sunday Otto deserted the group with 
around other 30 fighters.100 This fallout indicated that Kony had a hardliner inner circle 
that was not interested in peace talks, while others allied to his deputy Otti were possibly 
willing to have a negotiated settlement. 
The governments of Uganda, South Sudan, and the DRC launched a joint military 
operation code named “Operation Lightning Thunder” in December 2008. The aim of the 
operation was to decapitate the LRA command structure so that the rest of the rebel 
soldiers had an opportunity to surrender and benefit from government mass amnesty.101 
It was also intended to rescue women and children who were LRA captives. However, 
the operation faced obstacles associated with the terrain—“weather, lack of roads in the 
area, wide rivers and other logistical difficulties,” which made it easy for the rebels to 
escape back into the ungoverned bush. In the period following the operation, the LRA 
went on rampage, killing more than 1,000 people in northeastern DRC and South Sudan. 
As a consequence, more than 180,000 Congolese and 60,000 South Sudanese were forced 
out of their homes. The LRA split into groups, sending some into the Central African 
Republic.102 
E. HOW UNGOVERNED SPACES AIDED THE SURVIVAL OF THE LRA 
IN CENTRAL AFRICA 
According to The Fund for Peace’s Fragile States Index 2015, which monitors 
sustainability, stability and fragility of states, the four countries where the LRA operates 
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from—the DRC, Sudan, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan—rank among 
the five least stable countries in the world.103 All four of these countries have been 
plagued by armed conflicts in addition to the LRA problem. The DRC has been at war 
since 1994, when armed Rwandan refugees went there and declared war on Rwanda. The 
Central African Republic has experienced coups and military rule since the1960s, while 
Sudan and South Sudan have also been at war since the 1980s. A combination of these 
weak states and ungoverned spaces has allowed the LRA to find haven and operate from 
there.   
Whenever the group felt military pressure from the government forces, it retreated 
to South Sudan, where it had established bases in hard-to-reach areas like Lubanga-tek 
and the Imatong Mountains.104 Even when Uganda and Sudan signed an agreement in 
2001 allowing Ugandan soldiers to follow the LRA into certain areas in Sudan, the 
pursuit remained an uphill task. Given the long period the LRA had spent operating in 
both northern Uganda and South Sudan, they had developed mastery of those areas, to the 
disadvantage of the Ugandan army, making defeat of the LRA difficult.105 The 
complicated terrain with numerous caves offered protection to rebels against modern 
military equipment including the air force. It was therefore not surprising that when the 
LRA was attacked in Sudan, it shifted to similar places in the DRC and Central African 
Republic, two countries with less infrastructure and minimum government presence. 
Once the LRA set up bases in the DRC, the Central African Republic, Sudan, and 
South Sudan, the group continued to abduct civilians to fill its ranks. The LRA also 
exploited—and poached—natural resources within these countries. In one study on how 
elephants are facing extinction in the vast forests of Central Africa, it was established that 
“criminal organizations trafficking in illegally obtained ivory have sprung up in recent 
years and the money involved has begun to attract terror groups—not just the Janjaweed 
from Sudan but also … the Lord’s Resistance Army from the Democratic Republic of 
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Congo and the Central African Republic.”106 Another report by the Enough Project 
quotes interviews with Garamba National Park rangers, LRA escapees, and senior 
defectors, indicating that the LRA trades in ivory for arms, ammunition, and food.107 The 
park rangers are usually unable to counter LRA poaching of elephants because the rebels 
are usually better armed.108 
In fact, for quite some time, the DRC, the Central African Republic, Sudan, and 
South Sudan have not been able to secure their territories from internal and external 
armed groups operating in their territories; that role of security is being partly provided 
by UN troops.109 The African Union (AU) has always drummed for support both 
regionally and internationally to ensure that there is some form of governance amidst 
institutional breakdown. Because of AU and UN efforts, there is the United Nations 
Stabilization Mission in DRC (MONUSCO), United Nations Mission in Central African 
Republic (MINUSCA), United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), and United 
Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMIS) respectively.110 These UN missions have 
prevented these countries from further implosion. 
F. REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES IN COMBATING 
THE LRA 
The process of combating the LRA has included diplomatic, legal, and military 
means. In 2000, the Ugandan parliament enacted the Amnesty Act that was intended to 
woo various rebels who were fighting the government to abandon rebellion without 
retribution. The LRA was also covered under the Amnesty Act.111 Although a number of 
LRA rebels surrendered and were reintegrated into society, the rebels’ capacity to wage 
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war was not much diminished, in no small part because ungoverned spaces require 
regional/international intervention rather than just a national response, particularly when 
an insurgent group like the LRA crosses borders into Central Africa where it could 
abduct people and refill its ranks.  
Realizing the destabilizing effect the LRA was having in the Central African 
region and its potential to further spread terror in ungoverned spaces, in 2001, the U.S. 
State Department added the LRA to its “Terrorist Exclusion List.”112 Again in 2008, 
under Executive Order 13324, Joseph Kony was named a “Specially Designated Global 
Terrorist” by the State Department.113 These two measures by the United States against 
the LRA were meant to galvanize regional/international bodies and nongovernmental 
organizations in the fight against the group.  
As previously indicated in Chapter One, the LRA may not pose a direct threat to 
the United States, but the group’s activities in Central Africa present a concern to the 
United States as it seeks to see improvement in regional security and peace building. 
Consequently on November 24, 2010, President Barack Obama spelled out the United 
States’ counter-LRA strategic plan to Congress with the following strategic objectives: 
“(a) increase protection of civilians; (b) apprehend or remove from the battlefield Joseph 
Kony and senior commanders; (c) promote the defection, disarmament, demobilization, 
and reintegration of remaining LRA fighters; and (d) increase humanitarian access and 
provide continued relief to affected communities.”114 In order to realize this strategic 
plan, it also required deployment of U.S. military advisors to the operational areas. 
In 2011, the African Union (AU) also “formally designated the LRA as a terrorist 
group and authorized an initiative to enhance regional cooperation toward the elimination 
of the LRA.”115 This initiative involves joint military operations against the LRA by the 
militaries of Uganda, the DRC, the Central African Republic, Sudan, and South Sudan. 
                                                 
112 U.S. State Department, “The Lord’s Resistance Army: Fact Sheet,” Office of the Spokesperson, 
March 23, 2012, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/03/186734.htm. 
113 Ibid. 
114 LeSage, “Countering the Lord’s Resistance Army.” 
115 U.S. State Department, “The Lord’s Resistance Army.”  
 32 
Subsequently, in 2012, the United States deployed around 100 troops in the Central 
African Republic to partner with the African Union Regional Task Force (AU-RTF) in 
operations to eliminate the LRA.116 Other international and regional bodies like the UN 
and International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) recognize the LRA as 
a terrorist group and have always rendered support towards its elimination. Though all 
these efforts have not yet put to an end the LRA, the group has been considerably 
degraded and weakened, and a large number of abducted children have been rescued. 
Currently, due to sustained military pressure, the group is now a marauding force with an 
estimated strength of 150–200 fighters.117 Continuous operations have also made it 
possible for about 12,000 former LRA combatants and abductees to be rescued and 
reintegrated into the Ugandan society.118 
G. CONCLUSION 
The LRA insurgency that sprung up in Uganda in 1986 proclaiming a desire to 
recapture state power has survived up to date largely because of exploiting ungoverned 
spaces that existed in Uganda in the early 1980s and then in other countries it has been 
operating—South Sudan, Sudan, DRC, and Central African Republic. By 2006, the 
UPDF had developed capacity to eliminate the LRA insurgency on Ugandan territory, 
whereupon the group fled to the Central African region, thus changing the dynamics of 
the insurgency. Due to limited state authority and lack of effective territorial control by 
respective governments, the group found it easy to operate in those environments. 
Because of these dynamics, regional players—AU-RTF—and strategic partners 
like the United States decided to combine efforts to bring the LRA insurgency to an end. 
Already, some positive results of these efforts have been realized through rescue of many 
abducted children and the surrender of some senior LRA commanders, including 
Dominic Ongwen, who is already in the hands of the ICC at The Hague. The 
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maintenance of the operations tempo by this partnership against the LRA presents an 
opportunity to bring to it to an end. 
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III. ANALYSIS OF AL-SHABAAB, AQIM, AND BOKO HARAM IN 
RELATION TO UNGOVERNED SPACES 
Like the LRA of Uganda, which exploited the ungoverned spaces that existed in 
and outside Uganda, Al-Shabaab, AQIM, and Boko Haram are Islamist terrorist 
organizations in Africa that also have used ungoverned spaces to mete out terror in their 
areas of operation. This chapter attempts to analyze how. 
As Humud et al. have observed, “Africa’s porous borders,” as well as “weak law 
enforcement and judicial institutions,” and the long-term “absence of central authority in 
states like Somalia, have provided an enabling environment for violent extremist 
groups.”119 The analysis of Al-Shabaab, AQIM, and Boko Haram is important because 
an understanding of these three groups helps policy makers and counterterrorism experts 
to discern differences and similarities in how these terrorist organizations operating 
across Africa, from East Africa, through Central, and then to West Africa, manage to 
sustain themselves and spread—as well as how they can be combated.  
A. AL-SHABAAB 
Al-Shabaab is an Islamic “insurgent group and a transnational terrorist affiliate of 
Al Qaeda” that became a dominant force in Somalia after Ethiopian intervention drove 
out the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) in 2006.120 Formerly perceived as a youth military 
wing of the UIC, Al-Shabaab has evolved over time, amid the absence of central 
authority in Somalia, into a jihadist organization that has not only terrorized Somalia but 
also carried out terrorist bombings in Uganda and Kenya and continues to threaten both 
regional and international security. 
                                                 
119 Carla E. Humud, et al, Al Qaeda–Affiliated Groups: Middle East and Africa, CRS Report No. 
R43756 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/
R43756.pdf. 
120 Peter J. Pam, State Collapse, Insurgency, and Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Somalia (Carlisle, 
PA: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2013), 22–23. 
 36 
1. Background 
Starting in 1991, when President Muhammad Siyad Barre’s government was 
toppled at the height of factional, clan-based fighting, Somalia degenerated from a 
collapsed state to a failed one, which it remains to date.121 A vicious war followed the 
overthrow of Barre, as clans and sub-clans vied for control of Mogadishu, the capital and 
center of power. Each group tried in its turn to carve out an area of the city as its 
stronghold. Outside Mogadishu, especially in the north of the country, other warlords 
also battled for dominance and power—and territory in which to wield both.122 The 
social and humanitarian impact of the war came close to a catastrophe as civilian deaths 
from famine swelled because the warlords confiscated relief food to feed their own 
fighters and supporters and to barter for weapons.123  
As years went by without any winner, Somalia fragmented. In 1991, the Somali 
National Movement (SNM) declared part of the northern region that borders Djibouti 
independent, dubbing it Somaliland.124 In 1998, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front 
(SSDF) took control of the northeast region of Somalia, declared it autonomous, and 
named it Puntland.125 Though this division brought some relative calmness in these two 
regions, it never translated into peace, and Somalia remained in turmoil. 
The absence of a central government in Somalia no doubt created favorable 
conditions for various armed militias to flourish in the country. One such militia was Al-
Itihad Al-Islami (AIAI), which operated near the border with Ethiopia with an aim of 
annexing the Ogaden region of Ethiopia to Somalia. Between 1996 and 1997, AIAI 
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carried out bomb attacks and kidnappings of aid workers in Ethiopia.126 The organization 
also was reported at the time to be receiving funding from Osama bin Laden, 
fundamentalists in the Arabian Peninsula, and members of the Somali Diaspora. It also 
obtained training for its personnel from Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and stocks of weapons 
from Sudan and Eritrea127—two countries that are known for their support for Islamic 
extremism. For example, the UN has imposed targeted sanctions on Eritrea for 
“providing political, financial, training and logistical support to armed opposition groups 
including Al-Shabaab” that are “engaged in undermining” stability in Somalia and the 
region.128   
In its operations, AIAI established schools and orphanages, which it used to 
indoctrinate youth with extremist ideologies. Later in 2004, some members of AIAI 
formed the Union of Islamic Courts in Somalia, comprising several different Sharia 
courts with different ideologies. While the UIC tried to assert its authority in Mogadishu, 
it at the same time allowed terrorist training camps to operate in Somalia, fraternized with 
Al Qaeda, and declared jihad against Ethiopia.129   
In the same period, the international community was trying to set up a semblance 
of government in Somalia, and the so-called Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was 
established with its headquarters at Baidoa City near the Ethiopian border. The TFG was 
a result of lengthy negotiations that began in Djibouti in 2000 among Somalis with 
different political affiliations. The TFG initiative had support both regionally and 
internationally because it was seen as a chance to reinstate government authority in 
Somalia and to curtail the growth of extremist groups.130   
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Because the UIC wanted to assert itself, in 2006 it carried out attacks against the 
TFG in Baidoa, prompting Ethiopia to invade Somalia with the intention of overthrowing 
the UIC. As the top leadership of the UIC faced defeat and fled to Eritrea, a group calling 
itself Al-Shabaab—which means “youth” in Arabic—sprung up. Al-Shabaab had been a 
military-youth wing of the UIC.131 
Al-Shabaab was able to mobilize followers quickly using propaganda, first by 
appealing to anti-Ethiopian sentiments, depicting Ethiopia as an occupying force of 
Somalia, and second, by claiming that Ethiopia was just a puppet of the United States, 
bent on fighting Islamist regimes in Afghanistan, Iraq, and now Somalia.132  
Amid the prolonged fighting, subsequent fragmentation, and total collapse of the 
country, various armed groups had to mushroom. For example between 2003 and 2005, 
the World Bank estimated that there were 70,000–80,000 active militia members in 
Somalia.133 Al-Shabaab capitalized on this situation, and its ranks swelled apace, thanks 
as well to the additional influence and training and equipment from Al Qaeda from the 
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen and other like-minded sponsors.134 Indeed, while 
in some instances Al-Shabaab impressed fighters by force, it also offered food and a 
monthly allowance of $100 to $300. The group also promised its soldiers that if they died 
in the line of duty, Al-Shabaab would support their families.135 This kind of mobilization 
helped Al-Shabaab to build a potent force.  
2. Al-Shabaab Organization and Leadership 
The first recognized leader of Al-Shabaab was Aden Hash Ayro who died in a 
U.S. missile strike in 2008. He was succeeded by Ahmed Abdi Godane, who was also 
killed by a U.S. airstrike in August 2014. During Godane’s rule, Al-Shabaab was riven 
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with internal rivalry among the top leadership, but after his death, Godane’s confidant, 
Ahmed Umar, assumed the primary role since he was considered to be a unifier. 
Immediately after take over, Umar reaffirmed Al-Shabaab’s allegiance to Al Qaeda 
leader Zawahiri. The group maintains an extremist strand of Islam and claims to be 
fighting with a “vision of uniting ethnic Somali-inhabited areas of Kenya, Ethiopia, 
Djibouti, and Somalia under an Islamist caliphate.” Al-Shabaab leaders have also on 
several occasions pronounced that they are “committed to the global jihad movement.”136 
Al-Shabaab is organized into four main structures; “the Shura Council 
(consultative body), the Qiyadah (the top leadership), the Mujahirin (the foreign fighters 
and Somalis with foreign passports), and the Ansar (the local Somali fighters.)” The 
Shura Council comprises about 10 men and forms the highest decision-making body. 
This body is known to be secretive, but it is believed that more than 70 percent of its 
members are foreigners. The Qiyadah is composed of field commanders spread across the 
country in their respective areas of command, while the Mujahirin are always camped 
and trained separately to prevent overexposure to the society outside and possible 
defection. Most of the Mujahirin have been in insurgent hotspots like Afghanistan, 
Kashmir, and Chechnya, and Al-Shabaab taps into their experience. The Ansar is the 
lowest organ that includes foot soldiers, conscripts, and recruits.137 Al-Shabaab also has 
an intelligence wing called the Amniyat that is responsible for carrying out suicide and 
assassination missions at home and abroad.138 At the height of the Al-Shabaab 
insurgency, AMISOM sources indicated that there were about 1,500 foreign fighters in 
Al-Shabaab ranks, while the total strength of the group ranged between 8,000 and 12,000 
fighters.139 
It is these numbers that Al-Shabaab has used to spread extremist intimidation to 
instill fear in the population. It also created sections of the force as religious police that 
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dispensed harsh punishments like “floggings, amputations, stoning, and beheadings, for 
violations of its strict interpretation of Islamic law.”140 In addition, it carried out 
“kidnappings, shootings, and targeted assassinations of TFG officials, journalists, civil 
society activists and aid workers.”141 Al-Shabaab also used “improvised explosive 
devices (IEDs) and suicide bombers” to attack AMISOM and government buildings and 
institutions, and the UN. For example, in 2008, it attacked United Nations Development 
Program offices in Somaliland and Puntland.142   
3. Al-Shabaab Terror in Somalia and East Africa 
The terror that Al-Shabaab has meted out in Somalia and East Africa stems from 
earlier terror acts of Al Qaeda in 1990s, when the group trained militants in Somalia and 
infiltrated cells in Kenya and Tanzania. In 1993, when 18 U.S. soldiers were killed in 
Mogadishu during Operation Restore Hope, Al Qaeda acknowledged that it had trained 
those militia members.143 As noted, three of the terrorists who masterminded the 1998 
U.S. embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam were trained in Somalia, though 
some of them were foreign nationals from Tanzania and Comoros.144 In these 
simultaneous attacks, 224 people were killed, and 5,000 were injured.145 After the 
bombing, it was established by law enforcement that Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, Wadih 
el Hage, and Ahmed Ghailani had trained and received funding to carry out the bombings 
from Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.146 When Al-Shabaab established itself in Somalia, it built 
on this linkage.  
At the height of its operations when it controlled Mogadishu and other large parts 
of Somalia before the AMISOM offensive, among its thousands of fighters, Al-Shabaab 
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boasted of hundreds of foreign fighters from Kenya, Tanzania, Sudan, Bangladesh, 
Chechnya, and Pakistan, as well as Europe, Australia, Canada, and the United States.147 
These foreign fighters found it possible to flock to Somalia because the country was 
fractured and could be used as a springboard for nurturing and spreading Islamic 
extremism. 
In addition to benefiting from foreign fighters in building its terror machinery, Al-
Shabaab received equipment and training from countries like Iran, Syria, Libya, and 
Eritrea. Somali communities in the Diaspora also provided support to Al-Shabaab in the 
form of logistics and finances. Such wider support came from Eastleigh in Nairobi and 
Dubai.148 Of course it should be noted that Al-Shabaab also earned significant revenue 
from controlling ports, road tolls, and taxes on businesses in Somalia.149  
Al-Shabaab attacks have not been limited to Somalia. In 2010, the group carried 
out attacks on crowds of people watching a live screening of the FIFA World Cup finals 
in Kampala, killing more than 74 people and leaving about 70 others injured. While 
claiming responsibility, Al-Shabaab said the attack was in retaliation for Uganda’s role in 
AMISOM.150 Two years later in 2013, Al-Shabaab again attacked Kenya’s Westgate 
Mall in Nairobi, killing at least 70 people and injuring 175. In one interview to the media, 
Al-Shabaab indicated that it had chosen the Westgate mall because it was frequented by 
“Kenyan elites, diplomats, and tourists, specifically Americans and Israelis.”151 Indeed, 
though no Americans or Israelis were known to have died in the attack, “at least 18 
foreigners were killed, including citizens of Britain, France, Canada, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Australia, Peru, India, Ghana, South Africa, and China.”152 Al-Shabaab 
claimed that Kenya was also targeted because of having troops in AMISOM. Besides 
                                                 
147 Ibid.  
148 Ibid. 
149 Ibid. 




Westgate, Kenya has withstood other attacks on its soil including at bus parks and other 
social gathering places like bars. 
Still Somalia is key to the group’s success—amid the lacking governance and 
governability of the state. After all, for more than 20 years, Somalia has had no 
government and therefore non-state actors have been able to move in and out of the 
country without detection, interception, or neutralization.153 
The Al-Shabaab attacks on Kenya and Uganda also demonstrate how an 
ungoverned space—in this case, Somalia—can be used to attract foreigners, train them 
outside the reach of any authority, and then send them to whichever target the terrorist 
group desires to strike. For example, in the wake of the Kampala bombings, a number of 
suspects were charged in courts of law, “including 14 Ugandans, 10 Kenyans, six 
Somalis, one Rwandan, and one Pakistani.”154 One Ugandan among those suspects told 
journalists that “he was motivated by a rage against Americans, including U.S. support to 
the Transitional Federal Government in Somalia.”155  
Likewise, in the aftermath of the Garissa University attack by Al-Shabaab in 
Kenya in April 2015, where more than 147 people were killed, authorities were able to 
identify Abdirahim Abdullahi as a Kenyan citizen. Apparently, his father is a chief of 
Mandera County in northeast Kenya. A law student at the University of Nairobi, 
Abdullahi joined Al-Shabaab after graduating in 2013.156 This trend of non-Somali East 
African nationals participating in the Al-Shabaab attacks indicates how terror groups like 
Al-Shabaab are using ungoverned spaces—the porous borders, nonexistent immigration 
control, and lack of central authority—in Somalia to recruit and network in East Africa, 
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thus posing policy implications for both counterterrorism experts and the international 
community, including the United States, in combating terrorism in the region. 
4. Intervention by the International Community in Somalia 
Aware that failed states and ungoverned spaces could breed general insecurity and 
terrorism, the international community attempted early to fix the security situation in 
Somalia, but these attempts were unsuccessful. In 1992, the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) decided to take action in Somalia by passing Resolution 751, which 
called for the UN to facilitate humanitarian assistance. The UN Operation in Somalia I 
(UNOSOM I) was mainly a small military force that was supposed to negotiate and 
reconcile the warlords, monitor a cease-fire, and coordinate and support relief agencies to 
address the problem of famine that had been aggravated by war.157 To make UNOSOM I 
more effective, a United Task Force (UNITAF) was created largely with U.S. support and 
funding—to the tune of 75 percent of its budget. UNITAF was created under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter with the mandate for peace enforcement and “authority to compel 
compliance by forcefully separating and suppressing the belligerents.”158  
However, UNITAF’s mission was limited to only five months so as to hand over 
to a multinational, UN-led organization, named UN Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM 
II). Under UNSC Resolution 814, UNOSOM II’s mandate was to continue the 
humanitarian relief effort in Somalia and restore the country’s political, law enforcement, 
and social institutions as well as its economy.159 Amid a projected international force of 
20,000, the United States contributed 4,200 troops that included a 1,200-man Quick 
Reaction Force. Among other countries that contributed troops were Pakistani and 
Malaysia. 
UNOSOM II met with stiff resistance from Somali warlords who wanted to 
remain in full control of their strongholds. This situation led to open armed 
confrontations between UNOSOM II forces and several militia groups, culminating in 
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fatal incidents on a number of occasions. In one such incident, Somali militiamen using a 
rocket-propelled grenade shot down a U.S. helicopter in Mogadishu in what would later 
be recorded as the Black Hawk Down incident.160 Armed confrontation continued to 
intensify within the first year of the UNOSOM II mission, thus undermining its success. 
For example, in one of the operations to capture one of the warlords—Mohamed Farah 
Aidid—in October 1993, 19 Americans were killed and 84 injured. In the same incident, 
scores of Pakistani and Malaysian soldiers were among the casualties while a number of 
Somali nationals also registered high fatalities. In March 1994, the United States pulled 
its troops from Somalia, and one year later, the UN brought UNOSOM II to an official 
end.161 This departure of the international community from Somalia ushered in another 
decade of further disintegration of the country as warlords sought supremacy and 
dominance over each other and the remnant population. 
Nevertheless, a bigger section of the Somali people, the international community, 
and other stakeholders in regional security like the United States did not lose hope of 
restoring Somalia as a viable state, well aware that continuous neglect would be 
counterproductive, particularly as the Islamists, including Al-Shabaab, were trying to 
hijack the country. In 2007, the year following Ethiopia’s unilateral intervention in 
Somalia to drive out the UIC, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1744, authorizing the 
African Union to deploy a mission in Somalia with a six-month mandate. This mandate 
authorized AMISOM to undertake the following tasks: 
(a) Take all necessary measures, as appropriate, and in coordination with 
the Somalia National Defence and Public Safety Institutions, to reduce the 
threat posed by Al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups; (b) assist 
in consolidating and expanding the control of the FGS over its national 
territory; (c) assist the FGS in establishing conditions for effective and 
legitimate governance across Somalia, through support, as appropriate, in 
the areas of security, including the protection of Somali institutions and 
key infrastructure, governance, rule of law and delivery of basic services; 
(d) provide, within its capabilities and as appropriate, technical and other 
support for the enhancement of the capacity of the Somalia state 
institutions, particularly the National Defence, public safety, and public 
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service institutions; (e) support the FGS in establishing the required 
institutions and conducive conditions for the conduct of free, fair and 
transparent elections by 2016, in accordance with the Provisional 
Constitution; (f) liaise with humanitarian actors and facilitate, as may be 
required and within its capabilities, humanitarian assistance in Somalia, as 
well as the resettlement of internally displaced persons and the return of 
refugees; (g) facilitate coordinated support by relevant AU institutions and 
structures towards the stabilization and reconstruction of Somalia; and (h) 
provide protection to AU and UN personnel, installations and equipment, 
including the right of self-defence.162 
Subsequently, the first AMISOM troops were deployed to Mogadishu on March 
6, 2007, comprising Ugandan and Burundian forces.163 The AMISOM force that was 
supposed to have strength of 12,000 has since been boosted by troops from Kenya, 
Ethiopia, and Djibouti.164 With more boots on the ground, AMISOM has been able to 
push Al-Shabaab from Mogadishu and other major towns in Somalia, thus enabling the 
FGS to carry out some minimum political steps including the establishment of a 
parliament and the executive, though many government institutions remain weak. 
In fact, the establishment of some of the government institutions has encouraged 
some Somalis in the Diaspora to return home. For example, a policy brief by the Peace 
Research Institute Oslo indicated this year that a number of Somalis in the Diaspora, 
especially from the U.S. and Norway, were returning home to contribute to politics, 
business, and civil society.165 The numbers are not big, the report says, but expectations 
are high. 
Although Al-Shabaab has been weakened to some extent in recent years, the 
group still has capacity to carry out asymmetric attacks both within and outside Somalia, 
a situation that may require AMISOM to stay a bit longer so as to fully degrade the Al-
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Shabaab threat. More and better government and governance in Somalia, conversely, 
likely will further degrade Al-Shabaab. 
B. AQIM 
AQIM is a terrorist organization that was founded in Algeria in early 2000 after 
evolving out of another Islamist outfit called the Group for Salafist Preaching and 
Combat (GSPC). AQIM’s initial goal was to install an Islamic state in Algeria, but it has 
since embraced internationalist goals including attacking foreigners, making common 
cause with other Al Qaeda–affiliated extremist groups in both West and North Africa to 
exert more regional influence, and propagating the Islamic extremist agenda.166  
1. Background 
AQIM came to prominence in Algeria in January 2007 after Abdelmalek 
Droukdel, one of the top leaders of another Islamic extremist organization called Salafist 
Group for Preaching and Combat, declared that he was changing the name of the 
organization to AQIM as a way of linking with the Al Qaeda global network. The GSPC 
itself had evolved from the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), which had been founded by 
Algerians who participated in the Pakistani/Afghanistan armed jihad against the Soviet 
Union.167 When members of the GIA returned from Pakistan and Afghanistan to Algeria, 
they opposed the Algerian Army, which had seized power after elections in 1991. In 
those elections, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) had won and was preparing to form a 
government. Like the GIA, the armed wing of FIS—the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) 
also opposed the military takeover. In turn, the army did not want Islamists to take 
control of Algeria since FIS was considered an extremist party.168 In response, the 
Islamists waged armed resistance, but they were overpowered.  
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In 1997, the AIS agreed to lay down its arms in return for amnesty from the 
Algerian government—while the GIA continued with the resistance. This military/
political contest gave birth to AQIM when Abdelmalek Droukdel decided to widen the 
war by engaging what he called the “far enemy” of Islam—United States and European 
states. To emphasize his links with Al Qaeda, Droukdel announced the formation of 
AQIM on September 11, 2006 (the fifth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks), and finally 
announced the merger with Al Qaeda in January 2007.169 
2. Organization and Leadership of AQIM 
AQIM has been using the Sahel region of West Africa to spread terror. While 
AQIM leader Droukdel is said to reside in the region of the Kabylie Mountains east of the 
capital Algiers, he has two deputies, Mokhtar Belmokhtar and Djamel Okacha, whom he 
has assigned to take control of the Sahel region.170 This region refers to “a wide stretch 
of sparsely populated terrain that runs across Mali, Niger, and Chad.”171 The Maghreb 
consists of countries that make the north tip of Africa—Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, 
Mauritania, and Libya.172 These countries have been characteristically unstable and 
therefore have limited state capacity to monitor and secure these expansive desert regions 
and the border line of the Mediterranean Sea. AQIM has exploited this environment to 
carry out kidnappings for ransom, cocaine, and human trafficking.173 
AQIM has such strategic objectives including “(1) the overthrow of the 
government of Algeria; (2) the creation of a safe haven among the Tuareg tribes of Mali, 
Niger, and Mauritania wherein it can obtain refuge and where it can also encourage 
Tuareg rebellion against central states; and (3) the targeting of France, Great Britain, 
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Germany, Belgium, and Spain through planned bombings by its affiliated members in 
Europe.”174 For example, in June 2013, French police arrested a 29-year old Algerian 
only known as Ali (alias Abu Jaji) in Vaucluse, in southern France, after getting 
information that he was planning to bomb the Eiffel Tower, Louvre Museum, and a 
nuclear power plant.175 Apparently, the suspect was in contact with other AQIM 
members and had been advised to first travel to Algeria to “benefit from a military 
training and training in combat techniques,”176 before he could carry out the plot. Ali’s 
arrest came just a month before he could fly to Tunisia via Algeria for the training.177 
The U.S. government has also been concerned that AQIM was expanding its influence in 
northern Mali through training the local militias there and expanding recruitment with the 
aim of advancing transnational terrorist plots. To this end, it is believed that AQIM has 
connections to other extremist groups in Libya, Nigeria, Somalia, and Yemen, among 
others.178 
In a period of eight years from 2003 up to 2011, for example, AQIM kidnapped 
63 Westerners, and some 150 million euros were said to have been paid to AQIM by 
European governments in ransom in the same period. Trafficking in cocaine has also 
allowed AQIM to acquire small arms and light weapons especially from narcotics dealers 
from South America. These arms pass through West Africa in the Gulf of Guinea. The 
group is also said to deal in smuggling of undocumented migrants from sub-Saharan 
Africa, especially from Cameroon, the DRC, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Nigeria, among 
others, and selling them to Libya and Algeria. These two countries then end up shipping 
these migrants to Europe at a profit—whether or not the hapless migrants survive the 
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difficult journey across the Mediterranean, often in overcrowded, derelict vessels.179 
These activities are reported to be part of the sources of funds to run the organization. 
This funding is said to be supplemented by aid from supporters in Europe.180  
AQIM actions indicate that though its original goal of establishing an Islamic 
state in Algeria remains, the group has been exhibiting internationalist ambitions through 
attacking foreigners, supporting other Al Qaeda jihadists and expanding regional control 
and influence as a way of realizing its caliphate dreams. For example, AQIM has been 
pursuing ties with other violent extremist groups operating in Libya, Tunisia, Mali, and 
Nigeria in such areas as coordinating operations and sharing training and personnel.181  
While AQIM continues to operate in the northern part of Algeria that is less 
populated and mountainous, it has deliberately shifted most of its operations to the 
Sahelian states where it is able to carry out its activities without hindrance because there 
is less government in these arid, often sparsely populated areas.182 Crucial to this AQIM 
connection and destabilizing effect are the Tuareg communities, which claim greater 
control over what they perceive as their historical homeland in the north that they prefer 
to call “Azawad.” The Tuareg have always complained of discrimination and neglect by 
the Malian government. Although there have been attempts to hold negotiations and to 
integrate armed Tuareg into the Malian army, the government has always reneged, thus 
leading to a buildup of armed conflict that is currently ongoing in Mali.183  
Indeed, in January 2012, a Tuareg rebel group called the National Movement for 
the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), together with sections of Islamic extremist groups 
including Ansar al Dine, AQIM, and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa 
(MUJWA), ganged up with “deserters from the Malian armed forces” and launched 
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coordinated attacks targeting government forces and installations in Northern Mali.184 
When the government forces faced armed defeat from the rebels, some units mutinied, 
leading to a coup in March of that year.185 The government collapsed easily because it 
had experienced institutional weaknesses and fragility, especially in the northern part of 
the country, which had been neglected for a long time. 
In the 2015 annual ranking of fragile states by the Fund for Peace, all the 
countries of Maghreb and Sahel regions where AQIM operates are rated to have been 
experiencing levels of fragility ranging from worsening to critical worsening for the last 
decade (2006–2015).186 Such continuous fragility certainly plays into the hands of 
AQIM. 
3. AQIM’S Terror in the Maghreb  
Algeria has suffered most of the terror attacks by AQIM, but neighboring states 
like Mauritania and Mali have also had a series of attacks. Such attacks have always 
targeted foreigners, military installations, and international organizations, among others. 
In June 2005, the group attacked Lemgheiti barracks in Mauritania in the northeast of the 
country and killed 15 Mauritanian soldiers. In December 2007, AQIM killed four French 
tourists in Mauritania, and this incident led to the cancellation of the famous Paris-to-
Dakar motor rally, an international motor-sport tradition for almost 40 years since 
1977.187 In the same month, the group carried out double suicide bombings in Algiers, 
targeting the offices of the United Nations and the Constitutional Court; 41 people died, 
and 170 were injured. AQIM also attacked the Malian army in 2009 at a place called al-
Wasra in northern Mali, killing 28 Malian soldiers.188 
AQIM’s intentions to target foreigners in particular and the West in general have 
been increasing overtime. For example, in 2009, the group acknowledged that it was 
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behind the killing of Christopher Legget from the United States who was stationed in 
Mauritania as a missionary.189 Further still, according to the U.S. government, AQIM 
was linked to the September 11, 2012, Benghazi attacks and the group “has always 
publicly urged its supporters to attack U.S. embassies and kill U.S. ambassadors.”190 
The Arab Spring that started in Tunisia in 2011 and swept through Egypt and 
Libya was initially perceived to have been driven by democratic forces, but in the 
aftermath, events seem to have worked to destabilize the Maghreb region. Islamic 
extremists, including AQIM, took advantage of the crumbling regimes in these countries 
to acquire arms and recruits amid the chaos. For example, when Benghazi fell into the 
hands of anti-Gadaffi protestors, some members of AQIM and the Libyan Islamic 
Fighting Group (LIFG) are reported to have raided ammunition depots and pillaged arms 
which included surface-to-air missiles, antitank missiles, and an assortment of 
ammunition among others.191 Some of those weapons are said to have been transported 
to northeastern Niger and western Chad, where AQIM is known to operate.192 
In the same vein, after the fall of regimes that had dominated the political scene in 
Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, the extremists took advantage of the situation to position 
themselves to fill the power vacuum that had been created. Although recent terrorist 
attacks in Tunisia are not yet confirmed as the work of AQIM, violent Islamic extremism 
is on the rise. For example, in March 2015, two armed men attacked the Bardo National 
Museum, a leading tourist attraction in Tunis, killing 20 people and wounding 44 
others.193 Most of the victims were from Japan, Italy, Colombia, Spain, Austria, Poland, 
and France.194 Three months later, in June 2015, a lone gunman described as a 23-year-
old Tunisian student, accessed a Tunisian beachside hotel in the popular resort of Sousse, 
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killing 38 tourists, most of them British; another 20 people were injured. Initial media 
reports indicated that the two men involved in the attack “had been radicalized in Tunisia 
and trained in an Islamist militant camp in Libya in the weeks before the attack.”195 ISIS 
claimed responsibility for that attack, which of course compounds the security 
environment of the region.196 
4. International Community Intervention in the Maghreb 
Because AQIM terror activities cover a number of countries, the international 
community has endeavored similarly to apply approaches that cover a wide area. The 
U.S. government, for example, has been conducting several initiatives in the Maghreb to 
counter AQIM and other violent extremists in that region. In 2002, the U.S. State 
Department launched the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) to bolster the military, border 
security, and counterterrorism capacities of Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Chad. The 
security personnel of these countries are supposed to improve their capacity in tracking 
“movement of people and goods across and within their borders through training, 
equipment and cooperation.”197 In 2005, the U.S. government announced another 
program called Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). This program 
focuses on “containing and marginalizing terrorist organizations by strengthening 
individual country and regional counterterrorism capabilities, enhancing and 
institutionalizing cooperation among the region’s security and intelligence organizations, 
promoting democratic governance and discrediting terrorist ideology.”198 Further still, 
this program is intended to make sure that the affected countries improve their capacity to 
disrupt and deny terrorists from recruiting, training, and using safe havens for terror 
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activities.199 All these programs are aimed at making these regions more governed and 
secure since instability in any of one of them is likely to generate ripples to others. 
Although TSCTP is led by the State Department, the issues that concern the 
military are implemented by the Department of Defense (DOD) program Operation 
Enduring Freedom Trans-Sahara (OEF-TS) that provides counterterrorism training and 
equipment like vehicles, radios and field gear other than weapons to the affected 
countries. Because of this program, the U.S. military has been able to train four rapid-
reaction companies comprising around 150 soldiers each in Niger, Chad, Mali, and 
Mauritania. These companies act as the core of forces tasked with control of borders, 
curtail smuggling of narcotics and arms, and general neutralization of transnational 
terrorists.200 
Recognizing that AQIM was having a destabilizing effect on Mali by allying with 
the Tuareg and other militias that have always threatened to move south and take over the 
capital city Bamako, the government of Mali in 2010 initiated a plan called the Special 
Program for Peace, Security and Development in Northern Mali (PSPSDN). The program 
involved 3,000 military personnel and other development officers with an aim of 
reinstating security and government presence in the north.201 This program was later 
supported by France (former colonial master) and the European Union (EU) through the 
provision of finance, military training of Malian troops, technical personnel, and 
equipment.202 For example, the EU provides about 20.4 million euros annually to Mali in 
support of PSPSDN, and this kind of assistance has been extended to other countries in 
the region to counter AQIM influence and fight terrorism in general. In 2011, the EU 
provided 450 million euros to benefit the Sahelian countries of Mali, Niger, and 
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Mauritania and 200 million euros for North African countries of Algeria, Morocco, and 
Tunisia.203  
In 2013, the UN also reacted to the situation in Mali by establishing the United 
Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). This 
was pursuant to UNSC Resolution 2100 (2013) intended for restoring state presence in 
northern Mali and supporting other institutions of government in order to achieve 
political stability in the whole country.204 MINUSMA was further mandated to “support 
the transitional authorities of Mali in the stabilization of the country by focusing on major 
population centers and lines of communication, protecting civilians, human rights 
monitoring, the creation of conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance and 
the return of displaced persons, the extension of State authority, and the preparation of 
free, inclusive, and peaceful elections.”205 The UN is devising these means of 
establishing a stable government in Mali so that the country does not degenerate into a 
failed state, which would lead to further destabilization of the entire region.  
Considering that AQIM and other extremist groups would want a chaotic, 
ungoverned area in which to build their strength, it is only such concerted efforts of the 
stakeholders that are already in place that can curtail their agenda of destabilizing the 
Maghreb and exporting terrorism globally. 
C. BOKO HARAM 
An insurgency that initially began as an Islamic religious sect in northeastern 
Nigeria in early 2002, Boko Haram embarked on a violent campaign with the goal of 
uprooting government presence and what it deemed to be Western influences in the area 
and replacing it with an Islamic state. The group has since carried out horrendous terrorist 
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attacks against the population, including shootings, bombings, and abductions threatening 
the legitimacy and unitary existence of Nigeria as a state.206  
1. Background 
As an insurgent group, Boko Haram was founded in 2002 in the town of 
Maiduguri, which is the capital of Borno State in northeast Nigeria. The founder of the 
group was known as Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf, and initially, the group was called al-
Sunnah wal Jamma, which in Arabic means “Followers of Muhammad’s Teachings.”207 
At the beginning, the group presented itself as a religious sect, claiming to be fighting 
societal evils like corruption and immorality. It also proclaimed its belief in Sharia—
Islamic law. This branding of the group attracted a variety of followers to it, including 
university students from the area. The group recruited vigorously through preaching and 
targeting of young people in particular. As the group widened in other neighboring states 
like Yobe and Bauchi, many young people dropped out of school to join. Some 
administrators of government institutions and university lecturers also joined the 
group.208 
Within two years of its founding, Boko Haram grew large and moved its base 
from Maiduguri to Kanamma, a remote area in Yobe State, near the border with Niger. 
Boko Haram preferred calling their headquarter “Afghanistan” as a sign of admiration for 
the Taliban and cherished being referred to as such.209 The group delighted in these two 
names as an indicator of the level of Islamist extremism they were capable of unleashing.  
In Yobe, the group started behaving like a state within a state by enforcing 
Sharia—which meant prescribing a strict legal code that involved “amputation of limbs 
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for stealing, stoning to death for adultery, and public flogging for drinking alcohol.”210 
The group also opposed Western education, modern science, and banking, and leaders 
maintained that all Muslims should eschew their way of life be it economic, social, or 
political as long as it manifested Western values. At this point, the name Boko Haram 
became prominent. Boko is a word from the Hausa language of West Africa that means 
“Western or non-Islamic education,” while Haram is an Arabic word meaning “sin/
abomination.”211 Thus the name well reflects the group’s antipathy toward Western-style 
education or the teachings of tolerance, secularism, diversity, and so forth. 
In an attempt to assert its presence, in 2004, Boko Haram’s core leadership moved 
back to Maiduguri and set up a mosque called Ibn Thaimiyya Islamic Centre. The group 
declared the center as its operational headquarters and demanded that all states in 
northern Nigeria adopt Sharia. That is when local leaders and the Nigerian government 
realized that Boko Haram was a security and political threat that needed to be countered.  
It is at this particular period that the government learned that the group was in 
possession of military hardware for its defense. Security forces attacked and seemed to 
have neutralized it at first. But in the subsequent period, Boko Haram continued to carry 
out attacks on government institutions, especially targeting police stations. In response to 
such continuous attacks, the Nigerian government launched a major assault on the group 
headquarters at Maiduguri in 2009, killing around 700 of its followers and destroying the 
mosque. During that assault, Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of the group, was arrested 
and detained by police; he later died in what is believed to have been an extrajudicial 
execution.212 
In the wake of Yusuf’s death, Abubakar Shekau assumed the leadership of Boko 
Haram and radicalized the group further. Attacks on police stations also continued, and 
now, the group demanded that Sharia be adopted in the whole of Nigeria.213 Shekau was 
also quick to develop links with Al Qaeda. When the group attacked the United Nations 
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headquarters in Nigeria’s capital city of Abuja in 2011, using a car bomb that killed nine 
people and injured 80 others,214 authorities realized that Boko Haram, by any other name, 
was no longer a local Islamic extremist group but an international terrorist 
organization.215 
2. Organization and Leadership of Boko Haram 
At the helm of Boko Haram leadership is “an Amir ul-Aam (Commander in 
Chief)—Abubakar Shekau.”216 Shekau is responsible only to a Shura (council) of 
commanders who are considered confidants in the organization. The Shura includes Boko 
Haram senior regional commanders and representatives of other extremist groups in the 
region like AQIM.217 In towns that are captured by Boko Haram, the group installs an 
Amir in charge of command and administration of the town and surrounding villages. In 
most cases, the Amir must have been born in that particular town or area.218 The Amirs 
have below them members of cells responsible for different tasks like bomb making, 
kidnapping, and bank robbery, among other things.  
The bulk of Boko Haram members are of the Kanuri ethnic group to which 
Shekau belongs. Like many insurgent groups, Boko Haram’s exact strength is unknown, 
but the U.S. State Department estimates the number to be in thousands, and Cameroon 
authorities estimate the group to be 10,000 to 20,000 members strong.219 Among its 
members are jihadists from Chad, Mauritania, Niger, Somalia, and Sudan. Most of the 
soldiers in Boko Haram ranks are young people in the age range of 30 years, but children 
from 9 to 15 years of age are also recruited into the group and “forced to traffic weapons, 
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carry stolen items, and hide guns after attacks.”220 Generally, the group has always 
depended on abductions to replenish its rank and file, though in its initial stages, some 
young people are known to have joined it due to unemployment and religious 
convictions. Of late, girls as young as 12 years old have been forced to act as suicide 
bombers especially in markets, bus stations, and other areas where people congregate.221 
Currently, Boko Haram has expanded its area of operation to most states in 
northern Nigeria including Borno, Adamawa, Kaduna, Bauchi, Yobe, and Kano. In 
addition, the group has infiltrated parts of South Nigeria including the nation’s capital 
Abuja and major towns like Lagos to carry out attacks. It has also carried out raids and 
kidnappings in Cameroon, Niger, and Chad. When carrying out attacks, the group 
employs both guerilla and terrorist tactics by “use of IEDs, targeted assassinations, 
ambushes, drive-by shootings, suicide bombings, car bombs and kidnappings.”222 It is 
also fond of attacking and burning down churches so as to instigate religious tensions 
between Christians and Muslims.223 
During its initial stages, Boko Haram was known to receive funds from external 
Salafist organizations, and such money was used to fund microcredit schemes for the 
followers. At times, followers might get some handouts including food to win them over 
to Boko Haram’s cause. But as the group increasingly turned violent, it started financing 
its operations using criminal methods like bank robberies, allowing its members to be 
hired for assassination missions and trafficking of drugs and illegal weapons.”224 Boko 
Haram at times uses extortion, whereby various individuals are threatened with death 
through telephone calls if they do not give a certain amount of money to the group.  
In addition, recently, some government investigations have linked the Nigerian 
Diaspora living in Pakistan, Europe, and the United States to money transfers intended to 
                                                 
220 Ibid. 
221 “Shocking Increase in Use of Child Suicide Bombers by Boko Haram,” A World at School, May 
27, 2015, http://www.aworldatschool.org/news/entry/shocking-increase-in-use-of-child-suicide-bombers-
by-boko-haram-1989. 




support Boko Haram activities.225 The increased volatility of Boko Haram also points to 
possible assistance in terms of material and training from other jihadi extremist groups in 
Niger, Mali, the greater Sahel, and even Somalia.226 It is believed that such connection to 
external jihadi groups has given Boko Haram the capacity to assemble IEDs and train 
suicide bombers. U.S. Africa Command officials have in the past also indicated that 
AQIM and Boko Haram are “likely sharing funds, training, and explosive materials.”227  
3. Boko Haram Terror in Nigeria and Neighboring Countries 
Scholars and policy makers have been trying to comprehend fully how Boko 
Haram has been able to terrorize Nigeria for more than a decade now, yet Nigeria is one 
of the strongest economies on the African continent. In fact, Nigeria is not only strong 
economically but also ranked fourth among the 10 strongest militaries in Africa.228 On 
the other hand, the country transitioned to democracy in 1999 following a string of 
military regimes that left it a weak state at the same time. This weakness is characterized 
by high levels of poverty, corruption, and unemployment that the terrorists seem to 
exploit.229  
For example a World Bank report in 2011 indicated that “54.7 percent of the 
nation’s population was lives in abject poverty.”230 Unemployment and 
underemployment levels in the country are also high, mostly affecting the young 
population. For example, the Nigeria National Bureau of Statistics indicates that 
unemployment increased from less than 10 million people in 2006 to about 17 million in 
2011. Further still, the percentage of the unemployed according to age distribution is 
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more than 35 percent of Nigerians aged 15 to 25 years and about 22 percent for ages 25 
to 44 years.231  
Beyond these circumstances, Boko Haram also exploits Nigeria’s vast, porous, 
and largely ungoverned borders for its terrorist ends.232 For example, Boko Haram is said 
to be fond of loading weapons on top of camels disguised as if grazing in order to enter 
Nigeria from Chad and Niger.233 The group is also said to have exploited state weakness 
and areas that are remote to set up bomb-making factories. In April 2011, a bomb-making 
factory was discovered in the Rafin Guza area of Kaduna state, while another similar one 
was also discovered in September 2011 in Niger state in a village nicknamed 
“Chechnya,”234 after the region in Russia that is known for being a hotbed of Islamist 
extremism and separatism.  
The geography of the area where terror groups operate has also been a challenge 
to security forces. The majority states of Borno, Yobe, Gombe, and Bauchi where Boko 
Haram operates have part of their territories in Sambisa Forest at the border with Chad. 
This forest is a game reserve covering an area of 60,000 square kilometers northeast of 
Nigeria, and Boko Haram has been using it as safe haven where they train, recuperate, 
and spring to carry out attacks and then retreat back.235 Also on the eastern border with 
Cameroon, there are the Mandara Mountains, which are also considered hard-to-reach 
areas.236 Considering that the Nigerian government already has institutional weaknesses 
like corruption even among security forces, provision of law enforcement in these 
mountainous and porous borders becomes troublesome, rendering such places 
ungoverned. It therefore is no surprise that Boko Haram has made such places their home 
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and a launch pad for terror acts in Nigeria and neighboring countries—Cameroon, Niger, 
and Chad. 
At the end of 2013, Boko Haram carried out large-scale attacks on villages and 
later targeted schools, churches, bus stations, and markets. According to Amnesty 
International, in 2013 Boko Haram “conducted more than 100 deadly attacks, killing 
more than 1,350 civilians.”237 Early in 2014 alone, Boko Haram is known to have killed 
2,053 people in major areas of its operations in northeast Nigeria.238 Later in December 
2014, the group is also known to have pillaged towns of Madagali and Adamawa where it 
abducted an especially high number of boys and men and killed those who tried to resist. 
In another attack in January 2015, the group ransacked towns of Baga and Doro Baga, 
where it destroyed about 3,700 houses and massacred numerous people.239   
Besides killings and destruction, the group has been abducting and raping women 
and girls in its areas of operation. One incident in April 2015 showed the level of 
savagery of the group when it abducted 276 girls from the Government Secondary School 
in Chibok, Borno State, and took them to Sambisa Forest where some were married off to 
fighters and others sold into slavery.240 With this kind of violence, according to the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) by February 2015, around 1.2 million 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) were taking shelter in the most affected northeast 
states of Adamawa, Bauchi, Gombe, Taraba, Yobe, and Borno. In Cameroon, since 
December 2014, Boko Haram has displaced 117,000 persons and in Niger, 50,000, while 
in Chad, 14,500 people have also been forced to flee their homes.241 So far, Boko 
Haram’s “campaign of terror is estimated to have killed more than 20,000 people 
between 2009 and early 2015.”242 
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Faced with this kind of terrorist threat, the Nigerian army has been struggling to 
keep Boko Haram restricted to the northern states, but it has failed to stop the brutality. 
There have been reports of soldiers on the frontlines complaining about insufficient 
logistical support and equipment. Their salaries are also said not to be paid in a timely 
fashion,243 at times going for months before they could be paid.244 In one incident in 
2014 in Maiduguri where Boko Haram terrorism is centered, soldiers complained that 
commanders were slashing their allowances for dangerous field duties by 50 percent at 
times. When their leaders tried to calm them down, the soldiers became riotous by 
shooting randomly. Some soldiers died, and others were arraigned before the court 
martial.245  
There have been reports of both political and military leaders who benefit from 
the general insecurity in the country. For example, top leadership in each of the 36 
Nigeria states receives about $4.5 million per month as a “security fund” which at times 
ends up on their personal accounts.246 The government has also been unable to get 
actionable intelligence from the local community because the Muslim population in those 
areas has lost trust in the government. The local population accuses the government of 
being arbitrary and at the same time fears reprisals from Boko Haram if they reveal 
information about the group. More broadly, the federal government of Nigeria is said to 
be facing structural problems including “lack of coordination and cooperation between 
security agencies; corruption; misallocation of resources; limited requisite databases; the 
slow pace of the judicial system; and lack of sufficient training for prosecutors and judges 
to implement anti-terrorism laws.”247  
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Amid all this turmoil, in 2013, a number of communities from the affected 
northern states created vigilante groups comprising especially young men purposely to 
counter Boko Haram. These groups are known as the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), 
and they operate closely with the security services. However, in some instances they 
become targets of the Boko Haram terror machinery.248 
4. International Community Response to Boko Haram  
Considering the brutality which Boko Haram has been visiting on Nigeria and 
neighboring countries, and in light of its alliance with both local and international 
terrorist groups, the international community has made efforts to curtail Boko Haram’s 
activities. For example in 2013, the group was designated a foreign terrorist organization 
by the UNSC, United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Turkey, and the 
European Union. In the same year, all the sixteen “member states of the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted a sub-regional counterterrorism 
strategy” aimed at combating terrorism in West Africa.249 The ECOWAS strategy 
emphasizes international cooperation in the area of intelligence, investigation, 
prosecution, and counterterrorism operations. Its implementation plan calls for 
strengthening “cross-border cooperation among law-enforcement agencies and 
elimination of safe havens for terrorists and other criminals.”250 
The affected countries have also formed the Multinational Joint Task Force 
(MJTF) aimed at patrolling the common borders of Nigeria, Niger, and Chad so as to 
curtail the mobility of Boko Haram. In response to this MJTF arrangement, in January 
2015, Nigeria was able to deploy more than 25,000 troops to the northeastern part of the 
country, while Cameroon deployed about 7,000 troops in its northern region. Chad has 
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also contributed troops to counter Boko Haram by deploying medium contingents of 
2,000 and 2,500 troops to neighboring Cameroon and Nigeria respectively.251 
There are other international players like Israel, France, the United Kingdom, 
South Africa, Russia, and China offering training and arms procurement to Nigeria and 
its neighbors, but these measures seem to lack coordination.252 In March 2015, the AU 
authorized a regional force of up to 10,000 military and other personnel to combat Boko 
Haram. The AU is still seeking further authorization for the mission from the UNSC.253 
On the other hand, although the United States has been in partnership with Nigeria in 
counterterrorism programs for some time, the tempo of cooperation waned around 2011, 
when Washington raised concerns about Nigeria’s human rights record and institutional 
corruption.254 But still, the United States is offering assistance through AFRICOM’s 
annual Flintlock exercise in Chad by training and offering equipment under the auspices 
of the interagency Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP).255  
Additionally, following the March 2015 presidential elections that saw 
Mohammed Buhari ascend to power, Washington has been reviewing its security 
cooperation with Nigeria for the better. In July 2015, after President Buhari’s meeting 
with President Obama at the White House, Washington pledged to offer support to 
Nigeria in the fight against violent extremist groups. Currently, the United States has 
already committed $5 million to the fight against Boko Haram.256 
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Al-Shabaab in Somalia, AQIM in the Maghreb, and Boko Haram in Nigeria have 
exploited ungoverned spaces and state weakness or failure to spread their agenda of 
Islamic extremism by using terror as a weapon. The three extremist groups are 
determined to create Islamic states in the countries where they operate, and they continue 
with the desire of creating caliphates in their respective regions. 
Like the LRA that originated in northern Uganda and has been exploiting the 
existence of ungoverned spaces and other survival methods like killings and abductions 
of young girls and children for enslavement and filling their ranks in Central Africa, Al-
Shabaab, AQIM, and Boko Haram have also perfected the art of mass murder, 
kidnappings, and abductions in order to sustain their terror machinery. The linkage the 
three groups have created with Al Qaeda and ISIS increase the level of the threats they 
pose. 
Bearing in mind that the kind of terrorism associated with these groups is 
transnational in nature, it is imperative that their terrorism agenda is confronted and 
contained before the groups gain more strength and territory. And because the affected 
countries and regions might not have the requisite capacity to deal with these threats, 
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IV. EVALUATION OF POLICY FRAMEWORKS IN 
ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM OF UNGOVERNED SPACES 
While ungoverned spaces at times can be synonymous with failed states, it is also 
true that ungoverned spaces can exist in relatively strong states as well; after all, not 
every nook and cranny in any country can be policed at all times.257 But there tends to be 
general agreement that if a state is unable to provide certain essential services to its 
citizens, then it is ungoverned and certainly weak, if not failed. According to Akomolafe, 
the services that a state ought to deliver include: “(a) provision of individual and 
collective security; (b) promotion of a civil society; (c) delivery of medical and health 
care; [and] (d) regulation of money and the banking system.”258 As the earlier chapters of 
this thesis have made clear, terrorists can and do thrive in the ungoverned spaces where 
the state cannot or will not see to such basic requirements of the people. 
In addition, states have certain obligations to their neighbors and the international 
community. It has been demonstrated in Somalia and the Central African Republic that 
weak/failed states that have reached critical points where they cannot rebuild themselves 
can have ripple effects, destabilizing not only their neighbors but also the entire region if 
left unchecked. In this sense, ungoverned spaces may be contagious. 
This chapter therefore evaluates policy options for any intervention process 
intended to rebuild states and eradicate ungoverned spaces. Schneckener provides four 
strategies in his analysis of “the effects of international involvement in areas of limited 
statehood: liberalization, institutionalization, civil society, and security.”259 These 
strategies are the basis of this evaluation. 
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A. LIBERALIZATION STRATEGY 
Liberalization Strategy posits that by the time a state collapses, the vital 
institutions will also have collapsed; therefore, it is important that the building process 
begins with conducting free and fair elections, allowing political parties to operate and 
encourage reforms in the areas of the economy, privatization and integration in the world 
economy.260 However, considering that states that are emerging from conflict are 
normally polarized on ethnic grounds, democratization alone may not work. In fact, 
liberalization or democratization without national unity often works counter to the goals 
of peace and stability. 
For example, when the Saddam regime was toppled during the Iraq war in 2003, 
the international community encouraged the country to hold elections and build a new 
government. However, the rifts between the Sunnis and Shias widened, and the country 
has continued to experience instability, notably at the hands of ISIS. It is believed that 
many Shia leaders and militiamen spent most of their years outside Iraq during Saddam’s 
reign. Once he was toppled, these former refugees now wanted revenge. The Sunnis, 
feeling beleaguered, have taken to terrorism or at least support the project to create the 
so-called Islamic Caliphate.261  
A similar situation has been playing in the Central African Republic, a country 
characterized by military coups. Starting with independence in the 1960s, the politics of 
the country was dominated by southerners—and Christians, for that matter. But in 2013 
when Seleka rebels—mainly Muslims from the north of the country—overthrew the 
government, the dynamics changed. (Seleka means “coalition” in one of the Central 
African dialects. By implication, Seleka is just a coalition of rebels.) The Christians 
formed an armed group called anti-balaka (meaning “anti-machete”) as self-defense 
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vigilantes when Seleka rebels moved south and took over Bangui, the capital city.262 
When the Seleka government ended in 2014 due to internal disorganization and pressure 
from the African Union and regional bodies, an interim president, Catherine Samba 
Panza, was elected. Christians then geared up for revenge and have been carrying out 
counter attacks on Muslim communities by killing and burning property.  
Currently the country is under the protection of the UN Mission in Central Africa 
(MINUSCA), and the violence has waned some—but not entirely.263 Still, the Central 
African Republic is planning for elections before the end of 2015. Conventional wisdom 
demands that what is needed at present is a continuous strengthening of the MINUSCA, 
the eventual disarmament of militias, and the formation of the national army and police 
with a national character, all of which would, in fact, be in line with the MINUSCA 
mandate.264 For all intents and purposes, such mandates are always good on paper but 
weak in implementation. In this way, the army and police would ensure the protection of 
life and property of citizens and hold elections afterward. At present, the elections may 
take place as planned, but the fractured society is likely either to remain or see its 
divisions aggravated.   
When it comes to liberalizing the economy, the belief is that because conflicts that 
take place in ungoverned spaces target both unemployed and underemployed youth for 
conscription and recruitment—as Chapter Three points out about Al-Shabaab in Somalia 
and Boko Haram in Nigeria—then if the economy is fixed, the non-state actors would not 
find potential recruits. The role of world financial bodies like the World Bank and the 
IMF is always prominent in fixing the broken economies of countries that have emerged 
from conflict through support for reconstruction programs. In the 1980s and the 1990s, 
such interventions were common in African countries emerging from civil wars. Uganda 
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was a beneficiary after the wars to oust Idi Amin and Milton Obote. The IMF helped the 
subsequent governments to revamp agriculture and carry out privatization and 
liberalization of the economy from state led to private ownership.265   
Uganda embarked on Structuring and Adjustment Programs (SAPs), which 
included layoff of government workers in favor of a small but effective workforce. From 
1992 to 1999, the government reduced public service personnel from 320,000 to 160,000 
so as to use such savings to improve salaries.266 During the same period, Uganda started 
the process of returning the property of Asians who had been expelled by Idi Amin, so as 
to revamp the economy.267 Also, one of the measures that the international monetary 
bodies took to alleviate the collapse of the economy was to cancel some of the debts 
owed to them by offering what they called Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt 
relief in 1998.268 To cut government spending on enterprises that were not performing 
well economically, the government had to privatize them. Such measures of privatization 
and liberalization coupled with some aid seem to have helped Uganda to achieve 
recovery from the perennial decline caused by war. For example, from 1992 to 1997, the 
country was already experiencing some reduction in poverty levels as the head count 
index of poverty fell from 56 percent to 44 percent.269   
However, the challenge in fixing such economies is that they are always in 
shambles after suffering the effects of war. Thus, they take too long to right, and even 
when they are repaired, they barely can compete on the world stage. But at least this 
relief may mitigate factors that otherwise would leave conflict countries to further 
violence and lack of governance. 
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B. INSTITUTIONALIZATION STRATEGY 
The advocates of the institutionalization strategy believe that once political 
institutions like parliament, the judiciary, and administrative councils are in place, then 
(good) governance will take root. Other features of this strategy are bodies like customs 
and immigration departments to strengthen border management, conflict-resolution 
measures like the establishment of traditional courts, and reconciliation mechanisms that 
can bring people together.270 For example after the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the 
government was faced with a large number of prisoners as genocide suspects, and the 
judicial system in Rwanda was overburdened. To be sure, the UN International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was in place, but it could only handle a few high-profile 
cases. (The ICTR is based in Arusha, Tanzania.)271  
This situation necessitated the revival of a local judicial system called gacaca in 
1999 to handle the overflow cases. Gacaca is a traditional court system where locally 
elected judges try crimes that were committed during the genocide, ranging from 
overseeing massacres to failing to prevent massacres or looting during the genocide. 
Through the gacaca, the prisons were decongested and communities reconciled so as to 
live together. However, these measures are only supplementary to the conventional 
judicial system; they are intended to last only for a short period of time. But they seem to 
have eased the tension in Rwanda.272 
The proponents of the institutionalization strategy contend that while the 
encouragement of democracy in a post-conflict environment is a good idea, it at times 
encourages “winner takes all” outcomes, where the dominant party or even ethnicity may 
dominate the minority, thus creating further divisions. To avoid such cleavages, 
compromise settlements like grand coalitions are encouraged. For example, during the 
2007 general elections in Kenya, the outcome was contested, leading to violence and the 
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deaths of more than 1,000 people. Although the then-incumbent president, Mwai Kibaki, 
of the Party of National Unity (PNU) had been declared the winner, a coalition was 
forged after a negotiated settlement brokered by former UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan. Ultimately, Kibaki’s closest challenger, Raila Odinga, of the Orange Democratic 
Movement (ODM) became the prime minister. The cabinet was also widened from the 
initial number of 17 of the ruling party to 42 in order to accommodate opposition 
politicians. ODM was an amalgamation of opposition parties that had rallied around 
Odinga to make a formidable opposition.273 Following the formation of the coalition 
government, the tensions in Kenya eased.  
The same power-sharing deals were undertaken in Zimbabwe when President 
Robert Mugabe’s closest challenger, Morgan Tsvangirai, became prime minister after 
disputed elections in 2009. The deal for the coalition government provided for 16 cabinet 
posts from Tsvangirai’s party—out of 31 cabinet spots.274 Similarly, during the 
negotiations to end the civil war between Sudan and South Sudan that had persisted for 
more than 30 years, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed between the 
protagonists in 2005 provided that the leader of the then-rebel group, the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA), would be the vice president of Sudan and at the same time 
president of South Sudan; thereafter a referendum in South Sudan would be carried out to 
determine whether southerners wanted independence from Sudan.275 This arrangement 
worked until 2006, when a referendum was carried out that called for the independence 
of South Sudan. Indeed, in 2011, South Sudan gained its independence.276  
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The challenge with such arrangements is that they rely on the goodwill of 
particular leaders and the extent to which they are willing to keep their word. The 
coalitions are negotiated from the top, likely to impede the evolution of participatory 
democracy, which looks like mob rule from certain angles. Nevertheless, the coalitions 
have the effect of easing political tensions as has been witnessed in these countries.   
C. CIVIL SOCIETY STRATEGY 
The civil society strategy is driven by the belief that when a country is emerging 
from an armed conflict, it needs a critical mass of people who are empowered and ready 
to transform it. All the disadvantaged and marginalized groups, including the victims of 
the conflict, should be the focus of attention because their empowerment is likely to 
translate into societal development. The provision of equal opportunities for all is 
paramount in this strategy.277 
In this strategy, it is also believed that once the government promotes such 
universal freedoms as the freedom of speech, assembly, association, and the press, then 
people will articulate the ills that have always afflicted them so as to get solutions. The 
catch here is that once a society has been mobilized, then members will have been 
empowered to face the challenges of rebuilding their societies.278 
In the same vein, external actors play a major role through the provision of 
humanitarian services like food aid, medical care, and trauma counseling for the war 
victims. The repatriation of refugees or the reintegration of child soldiers back into the 
community is also carried out by these external actors. UN agencies like UNICEF and 
other NGOs are always at the forefront of such activities. However, the challenge in this 
strategy is that these activities are likely to be sabotaged by non state actors when the 
conflict is still ongoing. As Chapter Three notes, in the early 1990s, when Somalia was 
facing a humanitarian catastrophe because of the war induced famine, the relief food 
meant for civilians was always being confiscated by warlords to feed their fighters and 
barter for weapons.  
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What’s more, some NGOs have in some instances used conflict as a “cash 
machine” and may carry out some activities that undermine the efforts of other players to 
pacify ungoverned spaces. For example, in 2008, long after the LRA had moved from 
Uganda to Central Africa, the NGOs in Gulu district in northern Uganda discouraged 
people who were living in camps for the internally displaced from returning to their 
villages, claiming that it was easier to provide for them in the camps. At the same time, 
the government wanted the displaced people to move to their own land and grow crops 
for food and markets so as to be self-sustaining. In essence, the NGOs foresaw their 
relevance waning, which would lead to no funding of their activities.279 Although the 
efforts of the civil society may be well intentioned in improving the lives of people in 
ungoverned spaces, the challenges from non-state actors and in the long run some of the 
actions of the NGOs involved may be counterproductive, as the scenarios in Somalia and 
Gulu indicate. 
D. SECURITY STRATEGY 
The security strategy is based on the premise that if a state cannot deliver the 
essential task of providing security, then sustainable development cannot take place. 
Proponents of this strategy further believe that when a state has collapsed or become 
ungovernable and there is need for external actors to intervene, then the focus should be 
on the restoration of the security apparatus—and monopoly use of force by the 
government.280 Programs like demobilization of non-state actors, security-sector reform, 
training of armed forces—army, police, and border patrol units—are all important in this 
strategy so that the state can regain its sovereignty.281 States like Afghanistan and 
Somalia that present destabilizing effects to neighbors and the international community 
fall under such a description.  
The security strategy is occasionally tempting to policy makers as the best option 
to address the issue of ungoverned spaces in the belief that once order has been restored 
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in a state, then the other programs as mentioned in the other strategies can be carried out. 
In other words, the security strategy can establish the necessary basis for the others and 
the governance they entail. After 9/11, when it was established that Afghanistan was 
sheltering Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda’s top leadership as well as serving as a launch 
pad for transnational terrorism, the United States and the coalition forces had to drive out 
the Taliban regime.  
However, while such interventions have the ability to dismantle the targeted 
regime, they may at the same time attract further resistance from hardliners and 
extremists by exploiting resentment of external forces and installed governments 
especially when these external forces have left. This drawback has been evident in 
Afghanistan, where the Taliban are currently regrouping in an attempt to regain cities and 
regions. In September this year, for example, the Taliban captured the city of Kunduz for 
the first time since they were thrown out of power in 2001. It should be noted that NATO 
forces scaled down from Afghanistan in 2014.282  
In Somalia, the situation has not been very different. While the intervention of the 
AU under AMISOM has been able to drive out the Al-Shabaab from Mogadishu and 
other larger parts of Somalia, this has not translated fully into an orderly transitional 
political process. Divisions based on clans have persisted, and other institutional 
deficiencies like corruption have slowed stabilization. For example, according to the 
Corruption Index Barometer 2012, Somalia “is considered one of the world’s most 
corrupt countries” in the world alongside Afghanistan and North Korea, sharing “a score 
of only eight out of 100 for transparency.”283 Al-Shabaab also continues to carry out 
asymmetric warfare in and outside Somalia. Some pundits on the Somalia conflict 
believe that given the nature of the clan system in the country, parliamentary democracy 
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based on parties may take time to produce a stable system as it requires time and 
nurturing. Clans take precedence over unity required for party politics.284  
Finally, one of the more potentially dangerous aspects of the security strategy is 
the tendency of the new leadership that has been installed to power in fractured states to 
use the security apparatus to suppress other dissenting political views and voices by 
associating them with either terrorists or armed groups. In such cases, the targeted groups 
are likely to escalate violence, thus turning it into a vicious cycle.285 In short, the stability 
presented by the external intervention may be short-lived if emphasis is placed on 
security on the expense of other strategies. Even with such challenges, failing or 
collapsed states cannot be ignored.   
Besides, under this strategy, when countries’ security apparatus breaks down, 
bodies like the UN, the AU, and other regional organizations may have to intervene and 
separate the belligerents so that cease-fires or peace agreements can be enforced through 
peacekeeping missions.286 Such interventions have been witnessed in the DRC, Kosovo, 
and Sudan in Darfur. When such missions are in place, programs like Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of militias can take place in an effort to limit 
the monopoly of use of instruments of violence to government security agencies. For 
example, when the LRA shifted to Central Africa and threatened the security of that area, 
the AU intervened by setting up the AU-RTF to deal with this threat.287 Later on, the 
United States joined the AU effort. This intervention has no doubt reduced LRA’s 
capacity to spread terror in that region.  
Similarly, regions that have become hot spots for terrorism proliferation due to 
Islamic extremism—like in East Africa because of Al-Shabaab and west/north Africa due 
to Boko Haram and AQIM—may be assisted through counterterrorism programs by 
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strategic partners, like the United States is doing currently. There is Partnership for 
Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT), an initiative funded by the United 
States and intended to develop counterterrorism capacity and capabilities of countries of 
the region so as to combat violent extremism posed by Al-Shabaab and Al Qaeda and 
other extremist groups over both the short term and the long term. Areas of focus include 
training of militaries, improving border security, general enhancement of security 
organizations and improvement in democratic governance. Countries benefiting from 
PREACT include Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, Sudan and South Sudan, 
Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Seychelles, and Somalia.288 A similar program called the 
Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) is being undertaken by the United 
States in western and northern Africa to combat Boko Haram and AQIM and other 
extremist activities. Countries that are benefiting from TSCTP include some of those 
from the Maghreb—Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. Others are from pan-Sahel like 
Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, and Burkina Faso.289   
These programs may not have eliminated terrorist groups in these regions, but 
these efforts certainly have curtailed their capacity to spread terror and expand. For 
example, in Somalia, thanks to AMISOM operations, Al-Shabaab has had losses 
including its top leadership through airstrikes, large territories, and revenue, which all 
hamper its operational capacity.290  
E. CONCLUSION 
Ungoverned spaces require intervention from the international community and 
external assistance to make them viable again. However, as this chapter has 
demonstrated, the kind of assistance must be well thought out so that resources are 
channeled according to where they are needed most. As the examples of Iraq and Central 
Africa indicate, some societies that are factionalized on tribal or religious lines might not 
easily embrace electoral democracy in the short run. Such attempts might create further 
                                                 





cleavages. In which case, the strong pillars of the state like the army and police must be 
developed first so that they can guarantee security of person and property. 
Additionally, other aspects emerge as important in the process of improving 
governance in societies/countries that have been ungoverned. The roles of NGOs, judicial 
systems, reconciliation methods, and economic interventions can transform communities 
so that they do not fall into a vicious cycle of violence. Examples in Uganda, Rwanda, 
Kenya, and Zimbabwe regarding these various aspects attest to that importance. 
The problem of ungoverned spaces forms over a period of time. The strategies 
aimed at addressing the problem therefore must be diverse, as has been shown above. The 
provision of security is paramount in any society/country because without it nearly every 
aspect of life may come to a standstill. At the same time, once security has been 
provided, other aspects of institutional building must also be addressed because if they 
are not addressed, security will not be sustained. It is therefore logical that these 
strategies are interdependent and their application should be treated as such.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
The issue of ungoverned spaces has been and remains a major concern for all 
international security players given the fact that when states fail or cede some level of 
sovereignty, the consequences usually reverberate far and wide in destabilizing not only 
regions where they occur but also globally. The outcomes of state failure and lack of 
governance have been demonstrated in this study stretching from the horn of Africa to 
Central Africa and West and North Africa. The security challenges that ungoverned 
spaces present today may not be new, but the transnational and globalized nature of the 
current security environment presents to both policy makers and security experts new 
dimensions to consider and to contend with. 
This study showed how extremist groups—Al-Shabaab, AQIM, and Boko 
Haram—use identical methods in carrying out their terror attacks. It also showed how 
they have been involved in efforts to coordinate their operations and linkage to the wider 
international terror network of Al Qaeda and ISIS. It also showed how the LRA has been 
coordinating with other outlaws like the Janjaweed of Sudan to trade in ivory for 
survival. This trend of extremist groups working together sets further security challenges. 
It is therefore imperative that in the future, further study could be conducted to determine 
the extent to which the post–Arab Spring security environment has aggravated the 
problem of ungoverned spaces and its implications not only in North Africa but sub-
Saharan Africa as well.  
When violent extremist groups turn young populations into killing machines, 
threaten to form whole regions into Islamic caliphates, they—and the ungoverned spaces 
that they exploit—become a matter of international concern. Fortunately, there have been 
policy frameworks designed to rectify the otherwise gloomy situation that is prevailing in 
ungoverned spaces. Beyond international cooperation through bilateral, regional, and 
multilateral arrangements that tend to mitigate the negative effects of ungoverned spaces, 
there are a number of aspects that affected states can always adopt to ameliorate the 
situation. These measures include embracing democratic practices to lessen violent 
confrontations; economic empowerment and general reduction of poverty levels; and 
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strengthening government institutions ranging from security, health, and education 
among others. Of course, Chapter Four showed there is no “magic bullet” to address the 
problem of ungoverned spaces; rather these policy prescriptions are interdependent and 
are likely to produce better results when their application is interlinked. 
Thus, there seems to be a correlation between governed-ness and governance. It is 
no surprise that most violent extremist groups have operated with more or less impunity 
in areas that are less governed. Therefore, it makes sense when policy makers try all 
means to make states more viable and running. Interventions, whether security, 
economic, or humanitarian, may work as starting points, but when underlying structural 
causes of state failure like ethnic divisions, corrupt governments, unplanned large 
populations, and porous borders continue to manifest in most parts of the world, then we 
may still have to move in cycles of ungoverned-ness.   
Finally, the use of ungoverned spaces by terrorist groups has far-reaching 
implications not only in the countries where they operate but also the regions and the 
international community because of the multiplier effect of terrorism that they are able to 
generate. Important to consider is that even when these groups may appear to be defeated 
or weakened, they can still reorganize and regain the potency to cause havoc as long as 
the states in which they operate still experience fragility. Therefore fixing ungoverned 
spaces should not be left to those fragile affected states; instead the international 
community should always take the lead.  
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